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DRONE ZONING* 
TROY A. RULE** 
The growing popularity of small civilian drones has generated a 
wide array of complex and unprecedented regulatory challenges. 
Many of these challenges, such as keeping drones away from 
manned aircraft, are matters that the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) is clearly authorized and well equipped 
to address. However, several other drone policy challenges relate 
solely to drones’ potential to disrupt landowners’ privacy and to 
otherwise interfere with activities on the ground. The nature and 
severity of these conflicts often varies greatly depending on a 
drone’s specific location; drone uses that are welcomed in some 
city neighborhoods may be prohibitively disruptive in others. 
The FAA, a centralized federal agency, lacks the information 
and resources necessary to effectively regulate these inherently 
local drone use issues. Recognizing this fact, cities and states are 
increasingly crafting their own drone laws. Soon, some 
municipalities might even find it beneficial to adopt drone zoning 
ordinances that specifically restrict where, when, and under what 
conditions civilian drones may fly within their jurisdictions. 
Unfortunately, the FAA has taken the position that it holds 
extremely broad regulatory authority over nearly every aspect of 
civilian drone activity—a position that threatens to preclude the 
development of valuable state and local drone policies. What 
aspects of drone activity could be better regulated at the state or 
local level than at the federal level? And what principles should 
guide municipal governments as they craft drone policies for 
their own communities? This Article tackles these questions, 
highlighting the potential merits of greater state and local 
involvement in drone law and identifying foundational principles 
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and concepts for the pioneering design of drone zoning 
ordinances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Which level of government should have authority to restrict 
where and when drones may fly above a particular city neighborhood 
to deliver pizzas or take aerial photos? Should federal regulators have 
sole power to make these determinations for every community in the 
country, or should local citizens and officials have a say? And what 
principles should guide policymaking aimed at addressing conflicts 
between drones and landowners? Technology often stretches the 
bounds of existing laws, compelling courts and legislators to confront 
complicated new policy challenges. Today, this pattern is repeating 
itself once again as governments face a complex set of issues arising 
from advancements in civilian unmanned aircraft or “drone” 
technologies.1 
Many of the new regulatory challenges associated with civilian 
drones relate to the risks that these devices can pose to manned 
aviation and homeland security—risks that the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) and other federal agencies are clearly 
authorized and well-positioned to handle. Federal regulation is 
needed both to restrict drone flying near airports, helicopters, military 
facilities, borders, and other nationally significant places and to keep 
drones out of the higher-altitude airspace where conventional 
airplanes fly. Nationwide drone registration programs, which would 
aid law enforcement officials and others in identifying unlawful drone 
operators, likewise require federal government involvement.2 
Uniform federal drone manufacturing and performance standards 
would benefit both the drone industry and consumers by enabling 
manufacturers to design drones suitable for sale anywhere within the 
United States.3 
However, several other new policy questions involving drone 
technologies relate primarily to drones’ potential to cause localized 
disturbances to private landowners. For example, in what specific 
 
 1. In this Article, I use the term “civilian” drones to refer to all non-military drones, 
including both commercial and recreational drones. 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 156–63. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 143–55. 
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neighborhoods and during what times of day should Amazon be 
allowed to send drones to deliver packages? Where and when should 
real estate agents be permitted to use drones to take aerial 
photographs of homes they are listing for sale? And under what 
conditions should wedding photographers be authorized to capture 
drone-assisted footage of an outdoor wedding ceremony? The FAA 
currently claims that it has preemptive regulatory authority over most 
of these issues.4 However, in many contexts, these matters bear little 
or no relation to protecting manned aviation, establishing national 
uniform design standards, addressing interstate conflicts, or 
protecting national interests, so arguments for preemptive federal 
jurisdiction over these matters seem tenuous at best.5 And with more 
and more states and municipalities crafting their own drone use laws, 
it is increasingly apparent that many questions regarding the scope of 
the FAA’s control over civilian drone activity remain up in the air.6 
State and municipal governments seem better suited than the 
federal government to address many of the inherently local issues 
associated with civilian drones. Drones’ impacts on landowners often 
vary significantly depending on where the drone is flying. For 
instance, drone activity tends to be far more disruptive over secluded 
residential backyards and pools than over warehouse buildings in 
industrial areas.7 Unfortunately, a large federal agency like the FAA 
is neither designed nor equipped to engage in the degree of location-
sensitive policymaking required to effectively account for these sorts 
of locational differences in every city in the country.8 Indeed, broad-
brush federal policymaking and enforcement can only take drone 
regulation so far. At some point, inventive new state and local drone 
policies will be needed to address those aspects of drone regulation 
that only landowners and officials with firsthand, neighborhood-level 
information can efficiently address. 
Eventually, some cities might even wish to adopt “drone zoning” 
laws—ordinances that supplement FAA drone regulations by 
imposing an additional layer of restrictions on where and when small 
drones may fly within their municipal boundaries. Cities and counties 
throughout the country have long employed horizontal zoning 
 
 4. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Section II.A. 
 6. See infra notes 173–79 and accompanying text (providing examples of recently 
enacted state drone statutes); infra notes 240–46 and accompanying text (outlining 
examples of recently enacted local drone ordinances). 
 7. See infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Section III.C. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016) 
2016] DRONE REGULATION 137 
techniques to segregate incompatible land uses and cluster synergistic 
ones in an effort to increase the productivity and value of scarce land 
resources.9 Zoning law rests upon the notion that, like a “pig in the 
parlor instead of the barnyard[,]” certain land uses may be perfectly 
acceptable in some locations within a city and yet be prohibitively 
disruptive in others.10 This truism applies equally to civilian drone 
flights. Accordingly, municipal drone zoning ordinances offer a 
potentially powerful way for cities to accommodate valuable drone 
uses within their boundaries without unduly compromising the safety 
and privacy interests of local citizens. 
This Article sets forth legal and normative arguments favoring 
greater state and local involvement in civilian drone regulation and 
offers some foundational principles for this emerging area of law. Part 
I highlights the recent growth of the civilian drone industry and 
describes why it would be difficult for an almost exclusively federal 
regulatory structure to effectively govern the nation’s increasing 
volume of conflicts between drone operators and landowners. Part II 
analyzes the complicated federal preemption questions associated 
with drone regulation, ultimately arguing that many types of state and 
local drone laws are legally defensible and are vital to generating 
efficient policy outcomes. Part III delineates those aspects of drone 
regulation that seem best suited for governance at the federal, state, 
and local government levels, respectively. Part IV then applies basic 
microeconomics to identify some guiding principles for the 
structuring of drone use ordinances capable of promoting more 
optimal use of the low-altitude airspace above cities and towns as 
drone technologies mature and spread throughout the world. 
I.  THE RISE OF SMALL DRONES 
The civilian drone industry has taken off in dramatic fashion in 
recent years. Over the past decade, the industry has blossomed from a 
niche hobby market into one of the most rapidly expanding markets 
in the world. Global sales of small drones increased by 167% from 
2013 to 2015, and sales are only expected to continue to climb over 
 
 9. Mona Qureshi & Robin King, 3 Ways Land-Use Planning and Zoning Can 
Increase Urban Density, THECITYFIX (Aug. 18, 2015), http://thecityfix.com/blog/three-ways-
land-use-planning-zoning-can-increase-urban-density-mona-qureshi-robin-king/ [https://perma
.cc/C9KF-NXDY]. 
 10. Justice George Sutherland is credited with first drawing this analogy between land 
uses and farm animals in the famous Village of Euclid opinion, in which the United States 
Supreme Court generally upheld the facial constitutionality of modern zoning laws. Vill. of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
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the next several years.11 These futuristic flying devices, which are also 
termed “unmanned aircraft systems”12 or “unmanned aerial 
vehicles,”13 come in a wide variety of sizes and models.14 Unlike the 
large military drones that have grown increasingly instrumental in 
overseas warfare,15 most civilian drones weigh a few dozen pounds or 
less and are designed for commercial and recreational uses.16 
A. Soaring Popularity and a Growing List of Commercial Uses 
Markets for both recreational and commercial drones are 
expanding at breakneck pace. Major retailers now stock their shelves 
with recreational drones and actively market them alongside more 
familiar electronic devices.17 For a few hundred dollars or less, one 
 
 11. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2016–2036, 
at 31–32 (2016), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media
/FY2016-36_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UMS-986S]; Paul Bedard, 
Drone Sales Surge 167% to 4.3 Million, U.S. Leads but China Catching Up, WASH. EXAMINER 
(May 29, 2015, 12:31 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/drone-sales-surge-167-to-4.3-
million-u.s.-leads-but-china-catching-up/article/2565240 [http://perma.cc/Q5LE-ZJMP]. 
 12. See, e.g., Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa
.gov/uas/ [https://perma.cc/T346-YF62] (last modified Aug. 29, 2016, 2:20:13 PM) 
(demonstrating that “unmanned aircraft system” is the term the FAA commonly uses to 
describe a small civilian drone). 
 13. See, e.g., John Horgan, The Drones Come Home, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 
2013, at 125 (stating that “drone advocates	.	.	.	generally prefer the term UAV, for 
unmanned aerial vehicle”). Drones have even more labels than those already identified.  
 14. See ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, http://www.auvsi.org/home 
[http://perma.cc/D7UL-ZU6Z] (providing an example of a large, global nonprofit 
association focused on advancing the civilian drone community, including by offering an 
unmanned systems and robotics directory and describing drone devices using various 
popular terms, including “unmanned systems” and “unmanned airborne surveillance”).  
 15. The primary legal issues related to military drones are markedly different from 
civilian drone questions and fall outside the scope of this Article. See generally Oren 
Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2015) 
(providing an introductory description of military drones). 
 16. See Jack Nicas & Colum Murphy, Who Builds the World’s Most Popular Drones?, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014, 1:54 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/who-builds-the-worlds-
most-popular-drones-1415645659 (describing China-based DJI as “the world’s biggest 
consumer drone maker by revenue, selling thousands of its 2.8-pound, square-foot devices 
for about $1,000 each” and portraying the ubiquity of DJI’s Phantom series of drones as 
comparable to that of Ford’s Model T in the early development of the automobile 
industry). 
 17. See, e.g., Sarah Nassauer, Sam’s Club Bets Drones Will Fly off the Shelves at 
Christmas, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sams-club-
bets-drones-will-fly-off-the-shelves-at-christmas-1433795119 (reporting that, for the 2015 
holiday shopping season, retailer Sam’s Club “plans to stock about a dozen [drones]—
from $100 models to $4,000 versions with high resolution cameras or the ability to pick up 
small objects”); see also Rick Aristotle Munarriz, A Drone Comes to Rescue Best Buy, 
AOL. (Apr. 23, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.aol.com/article/2015/04/23/drone-could-rescue-
best-buy/21174684/ [http://perma.cc/Q2FT-LVSV] (describing retailer Best Buy’s preparations 
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can easily purchase a ready-to-fly drone equipped with a high-
definition camera and zoom lens capable of capturing aerial photos 
and video previously attainable only aboard airplanes or helicopters.18 
In part because of this burgeoning retail market, some commentators 
predict that there will be more than one million drone flights per day 
in the United States by the year 2035.19 
Commercial enterprises are also showing increasing interest in 
the wide range of potentially valuable applications of drone 
technologies. The agricultural industry is abuzz over the prospective 
cost savings and safety advantages of using drones for crop dusting20 
and surveying.21 Amazon and other companies are actively pursuing 
plans to use drones for product deliveries.22 Popular interest in drone-
 
to begin selling drones in its brick and mortar stores as part of the company’s turnaround 
plan); Photography Drones, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?node=9699105011 
[http://perma.cc/EQ9F-BBNM] (showing Amazon’s online retail presence for civilian 
drones). 
 18. See Jim Fisher, The Best Drones of 2016, PCMAG.COM (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www
.pcmag.com/roundup/337251/the-best-drones [http://perma.cc/C3JJ-U6QX] (reviewing several 
high-performing recreational drones that are available on the mainstream retail market). 
 19. Andrew Wood, Are There Enough Drone Laws for the Coming Drone Wars?, 
CNBC (May 29, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/29/drones-and-drone-laws
-are-starting-to-take-off.html [http://perma.cc/GQY9-N6RD] (citing a study by the 
Consumer Electronics Association); CEA Research: UAS Could Reach 1 Million U.S. Flights 
a Day in 20 Years, CONSUMER TECH. ASS’N (May 5, 2015), https://www.ce.org/News/News-
Releases/Press-Releases/2015-Press-Releases/CEA-Research-UAS-Could-Reach-1-Million-U
-S-Flights.aspx [http://perma.cc/E77S-89PD]. 
 20. Quinten Plummer, FAA Approves Yamaha RMAX Drone to Spray Crops in U.S., 
TECH TIMES (May 6, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/51049/20150506
/faa-approves-yamaha-rmax-drone-to-spray-crops-in-u-s.htm [http://perma.cc/F2AX-V7VE] 
(describing the FAA’s grant of an exemption for the use of a type of Yamaha-produced 
drone to “disperse tanks of fertilizer and pesticides across large swathes of land”); see also 
Luke Runyon, Monsanto, World’s Largest Seed Company, Sets off a Corporate ‘Feeding 
Frenzy’, NEB. EDUC. TELECOMMS. (Aug. 17, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://netnebraska.org/article
/news/986002/monsanto-worlds-largest-seed-company-sets-corporate-feeding-frenzy [http://
perma.cc/48YU-PRQK] (noting that Monsanto has “started looking at how drones can be 
deployed on farms”). 
 21. See Clay Dillow, Why 2015 Is the Year Agriculture Drones Take off, FORTUNE 
(May 18, 2015, 5:02 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/18/drone-agriculture/ [http://perma.cc
/7UCQ-LX9W] (describing some agricultural companies’ plans to use drones to assist in 
crop monitoring and data gathering as a means of boosting crop yields). 
 22. See, e.g., Jordan Golson, Patent Application Reveals New Details About Amazon’s 
Drone, WIRED (May 15, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/patent-application-
reveals-new-details-amazons-drone/ [http://perma.cc/N6ZU-8AZV] (describing Amazon’s 
patent application for an elaborate aerial delivery system using drone technologies); see 
also Delivery by Drone in 30 Minutes? Amazon Says It’s Coming, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 
2015, 2:29 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-drones-20150617-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/2JVN-NC3A] (describing Amazon’s plans to use drones to quickly 
deliver consumer products); Jack Nicas & Greg Bensinger, Delivery Drones Hit Bumps on 
Path to Doorstep, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 12:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/technical-hurdles-delay-drone-deliveries-1426867441 (describing drone delivery research 
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assisted real estate photography23 and wedding photography24 
continues to grow. Additionally, companies are using drones to help 
monitor railway systems,25 pipelines,26 power lines,27 and other 
infrastructure. 
B. An Overwhelmed FAA 
The recent proliferation of civilian drones throughout the 
country has brought with it a wide range of new policy issues. Some of 
these issues relate to the threat of hazardous collisions between 
drones and conventional aircraft.28 However, many other issues stem 
from the growing incidence of conflicts between civilian drones and 
activities on the ground. Individuals flying camera-fitted drones above 
residential neighborhoods have disturbed sunbathers in their private 
yards.29 Sports fans have flown drones into stadiums and interfered 
 
conducted by Amazon.com, Inc., Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., Deutsche Post DHL, 
Google, and other companies). 
 23. See Amrita Jayakumar, Using Drones to Sell Homes—Except in Washington, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/using-drones-to-
sell-homes--except-in-washington/2015/02/06/06f69320-a573-11e4-a06b-9df2002b86a0_story
.html [https://perma.cc/ZH2D-G466] (“Real estate agents across the country have become 
enthusiastic adopters of drone technology, using the lightweight, camera-equipped 
quadcopters to get creative with their marketing material.”). 
 24. See Matt McFarland, Drones: The Next Big Thing in Wedding Photography, or a 
Tacky Intrusion?, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/innovations/wp/2015/02/24/drones-the-next-big-thing-in-wedding-photography-or-a-tacky-
intrusion/ [http://perma.cc/U9J7-7Y7N] (“Drones outfitted with a camera are increasingly 
being used to document weddings as couples are drawn to the unique aerial perspective.”). 
 25. See David Z. Morris, Why BNSF Railway Is Using Drones to Inspect Thousands of 
Miles of Rail Lines, FORTUNE (May 29, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/29/bnsf
-drone-program/ [http://perma.cc/QH6Q-PQZ4] (describing BNSF Railway’s receipt of 
FAA approval to use drones to more cheaply inspect its rail system to prevent derailments 
and other potential safety problems). 
 26. See Jack Nicas, FAA Gives Approval to BP to Use Commercial Drones, WALL ST. 
J. (June 10, 2014, 9:00 AM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-launches-landmark-drone-
program-in-alaska-1402404549 (describing the FAA’s grant of regulatory approval for BP 
to use drones to inspect its oil fields and pipelines near Prudhoe Bay, Alaska). 
 27. See Rebecca Smith, Utilities Turn to Drones to Inspect Power Lines and Pipelines, 
WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2015, 11:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/utilities-turn-to-drones-
to-inspect-power-lines-and-pipelines-1430881491 (noting that “unmanned aerial systems 
can have tremendous value for utilities and other companies that must regularly inspect 
hard-to-reach equipment”). 
 28. See Ashley Halsey III, $1.9 Million Fine Proposed for Firm’s Drone Activities, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2015, at A17 (“As of Sept. 27, the FAA had logged 920 reports of 
drone sightings [in 2015]—most coming from commercial or general-aviation pilots.”); 
Craig Whitlock, Rogue Drones Clogging U.S. Airspace, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2015, at A1 
(describing more than seventy near encounters between drones and airplanes in the 
United States during the first twenty days of August 2015). 
 29. See Tara Evans, Neighbors Complain of Drones Flying over Winter Park Back 
Yards, CLICKORLANDO.COM (May 7, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://www.clickorlando.com
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with athletic events.30 Drones have crashed into houses31 and into 
spectators at public parades32 and festivals.33 Individuals have also 
intentionally sought to ground unwelcome drones hovering near 
building fires,34 next to large arenas,35 or just outside their homes.36 
Because the widespread use of civilian drone technologies is so new, 
there are relatively few legal rules in place to address these conflicts.37 
 
/news/florida/orange-county/neighbors-complain-of-drones-flying-over-winter-park-
back-yards [http://perma.cc/UR8W-DQYN] (quoting a Florida resident alleging that a 
drone flying in her neighborhood was “recording the teenager across the street, who lays 
out in her front yard in her bikini”); Harriet Thurley, Flying Drone Films Woman 
Sunbathing in Her Garden, COSMOPOLITAN (May 26, 2015), http://www.cosmopolitan.co.uk
/reports/news/a35960/drone-films-woman-sunbathing/ [https://perma.cc/6E6J-N2YU] (adding 
that “Selena Gomez, Rihanna, Anne Hathaway and Jennifer Garner have also been 
bothered” by drones). 
 30. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Rogue Drones at Sports Events Propel Concerns About 
Safety, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2014, at A1 (noting that between August 2014 and 
November 2014, “at least a half-dozen” drone sightings were reported at college or NFL 
football games); Melanie Burney, Drone Spotted at Stadium During Phillies Game, 
PHILLY.COM (June 2, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-06-02/news/62926148_1_phillies-
game-drone-third-base-gate [https://perma.cc/F56T-YY5Q] (describing a flying drone inside 
the stadium at a Philadelphia Phillies Major League Baseball game); Margaret Harding, 
FAA Investigating Drone Spotted Flying Above Pirates Game at PNC Park, TRIBLIVE 
(June 27, 2014, 4:41 PM), http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/6357452-74/game-drone-
park [https://perma.cc/F56T-YY5Q] (reporting on a drone flying over a Pittsburgh Pirates 
game). 
 31. See Jenna Portnoy, Drone Airspace: A Legal Frontier, WASH. POST, July 15, 2015, 
at B1 (describing a drone’s collision into the front of a residential home in Fairfax County, 
Virginia). 
 32. See Steve Annear, Drone Crashes on Parade Spectator in Marblehead, BOS. GLOBE 
(May 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/26/drone-crashes-down-
spectator-during-memorial-day-parade/UFt2MohBZ9ZQZU49EcLsxN/story.html [https://
perma.cc/DM5X-C5UG]. 
 33. See Haley Rush, Drone Hits Person at Albuquerque Festival, KRQE NEWS 13 
(June 14, 2015, 10:49 PM), http://krqe.com/2015/06/14/drone-hits-person-at-albuquerque-
festival/ [https://perma.cc/U78B-9SK4]. 
 34. See Michael Franco, Watch Firefighters Blast Drone out of Sky with Hose, CNET 
(June 10, 2015, 10:22 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/watch-firefighters-blast-drone-out-of-
sky-with-hose/ [https://perma.cc/P9CK-U9LF] (describing firefighters’ seemingly intentional 
use of a fire hose to spray a drone and prevent it from recording a house fire). 
 35. See Joseph Serna & Brian Bennett, Mystery Surrounds Drone That Flew Above 
L.A. Kings Victory Party, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local
/lanow/la-me-ln-kings-game-drone-no-owner-20140616-story.html [https://perma.cc/7CUR-
B4MR0]. 
 36. See Douglas Ernst, Ky. Man Arrested After Shooting Down $1,800 Drone 
Hovering over Sunbathing Daughter, WASH. TIMES (July 30, 2015), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/30/william-merideth-arrested-after-shooting-down-1800/ 
[https://perma.cc/27XL-69DU]; Jordan Graham, Huntington Beach Man Swats, Destroys 
$1,350 Drone with His T-Shirt, ORANGE CTY. REG. (June 6, 2015, 7:55 PM), http://www
.ocregister.com/articles/drone-664910-flying-beach.html [https://perma.cc/5Y2K-9ZWH]. 
 37. See Frank Vallese, New Rules Fuel the Growth of the Commercial Drone Industry, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/05/new-rules-fuel-the-growth
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Aware of the escalating need for laws to govern the domestic 
drone industry, Congress enacted provisions in the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (“FMRA”) that instruct the 
Secretary of Transportation to develop a regulatory structure for the 
domestic drone industry.38 Since then, the FAA, which operates 
within the United States Department of Transportation, has been 
diligently working to formulate policies capable of facilitating safe 
and orderly civilian drone activity.39 Unfortunately, despite its steady 
efforts, sophistication, and long history of regulating manned flight,40 
the FAA has failed to meet statutory deadlines for regulating drone 
technologies.41 Meanwhile, thousands of potential commercial drone 
technology users in the United States have had to wait on the 
sidelines.42 By one estimate, the agency’s delays were costing the 
nation $27 million in economic impact per day.43 
 
-of-the-commercial-drone-industry/ [https://perma.cc/9CDD-MN2C] (“The view from the 
industry is that the FAA’s final rules will successfully fuel the proliferation of drone 
technology for non-recreational applications.”); infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.  
 38. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §	332(a)(1), 126 
Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (providing that the FAA shall “develop a	comprehensive plan to safely 
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace 
system”).  
 39. Id. §	332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73 (requiring the FAA to develop such policies “as 
soon as practicable”).  
 40. See Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme 
Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and Local Impediments to Airport 
Expansion, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 963–67 (2003) (providing a detailed summary of the 
history of regulating manned flight). 
 41. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 §	332(a)(3)(1), 126 Stat. at 73–
74 (identifying the deadline for the FAA to create a plan for the “integration of civil 
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & 
Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 400 (2015) 
(same); Keith Wagstaff, FAA Misses Deadline for Creating Drone Regulations, NBC 
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:29 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/innovation/faa-misses-
deadline-creating-drone-regulations-n437016 [https://perma.cc/8BV4-2XFH] (reporting 
that the FAA had “failed to meet” its September 2015 deadline for creating a national 
drone regulatory structure).  
 42. See, e.g., John Goglia, FAA Speeds up Small Drone Exemptions. But Why Not Just 
Issue Blanket Exemption?, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/johngoglia/2015/04/12/faa-speeds-up-small-drone-exemptions-but-why-not-just-issue-blanket-
exemption/#1437f8b24132 [https://perma.cc/5WJZ-6VUX] (describing the FAA’s initiation 
of a summary grant process to accelerate its issuance of section 333 exemptions for 
commercial drone uses and noting that, as a result, the agency meagerly increased to a 
pace of just thirty such exemptions per week, “highlight[ing] the FAA’s problem in 
regulating small drones on an individual basis	.	.	.	that are growing in popularity by the 
thousands or even tens of thousands”).  
 43. See Matt Grosack, Stakes Are High for Domestic Drone Industry, DAILY BUS. 
REV. (May 28, 2015), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202727703584/Stakes-Are-
High-for-Domestic-Drone-Industry?slreturn=20160902140903 (citing figures from an 
economic report by the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International).  
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C. The FAA’s Attempts to Fly Solo 
Rather than actively inviting state and local governments to join 
in forming a coordinated drone regulatory system to address these 
new and perplexing policy challenges, the FAA has thus far largely 
opted to regulate drones on its own. Unfortunately, as civilian drone 
use has expanded throughout the country, the nation’s burgeoning 
volume of drone activity has made it increasingly impractical and 
inefficient for the agency alone to carry this ever-growing regulatory 
burden.44 
In some instances, the FAA has responded to the growing 
volume of drone regulatory work by proposing wide-sweeping rules 
that strictly prohibit certain drone activities regardless of location.45 
In other instances, the FAA has taken a converse approach, 
weakening certain drone regulations in ways that reduce the agency’s 
need to consider the locations where drones are proposed to fly.46 
Regrettably, despite these and other efforts, the FAA continues to 
have difficulty keeping up with the rapidly expanding drone industry. 
Its struggles were on display once again in late 2015 as the agency 
 
 44. See Ben Popper, FAA Misses Deadline to Broadly Legalize Commercial Drones, 
THE VERGE (Oct. 1, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/10/1/9432353/faa-
misses-congressional-deadline-to-integrate-drones [https://perma.cc/9S9S-MTBW] (noting 
that the FAA had granted more than 1,000 section 333 exemptions but that the “backlog 
of applicants is building”). 
 45. The FAA’s long-awaited notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) on small 
commercial drones (released in February 2015) proposed multiple drone restrictions that 
give little or no consideration to the location where a drone is flying. See Operation and 
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9544–46 (proposed 
Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107). For example, the NPRM proposed 
prohibitions on flying drones directly above individuals who are uninvolved with the drone 
flight and prohibitions on flying drones beyond the operator’s or other designated 
observer’s visual line of sight, even in areas where there are no people or potential hazards 
below. See id.; see also Steven Miller & Nicole Witt, The Wild West of Commercial 
Drones—Why 2015 Could Be a Pivotal Year in California, 38 CAL. PUB. L.J., no. 2, Spring 
2015, at 1, 3–4 (summarizing major restrictions proposed in the February 2015 NPRM).  
 46. See, e.g., WILLIAM V. O’CONNOR ET AL., MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, CLIENT 
ALERT: DRONES: FAA ANNOUNCES PATHFINDER PROGRAM TO EXPLORE BVLOS AND 
URBAN DRONE OPERATIONS 1 (May 22, 2015), https://media2.mofo.com/documents
/150522dronefaapathfinder.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJZ6-2TV9] (stating that in March of 
2015, the FAA began issuing broad “blanket” certificates of authorization (“COAs”) to 
dozens of drone operators who had previously received certain FAA exemptions). 
Recipients of these new COAs may operate their drones “anywhere in the country except 
restricted airspace and other areas, such as major cities, where the FAA prohibits [drone] 
operations.” See FAA Streamlines UAS COAs for Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=82245&omniRss=news_updatesAoc&cid=101_N
_U [https://perma.cc/2Q6J-WXVT] (last modified Mar. 24, 2015, 12:46:43 PM). These 
blanket COAs essentially convert authorizations to fly drones in specific geographic areas 
into authorizations to fly them almost anywhere in the United States. Id. 
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scrambled to put a drone registration regime into place before the 
holiday season, when retailers in the United States anticipated selling 
hundreds of thousands of small drones.47 As the agency hastily rolled 
out its registration system, critics expressed concerns about the 
FAA’s use of an expedited rulemaking process and panned the FAA 
for not initiating action much sooner.48 
II.  DRONES AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
While waiting for the FAA to formulate a federal drone 
regulatory scheme, many states and municipalities have grown 
increasingly impatient and have begun to enact their own drone use 
restrictions.49 Aware of this uptick in state and local drone laws, the 
FAA’s Office of the Chief Counsel issued a fact sheet in December 
2015 reiterating the agency’s bold position that it holds broad 
authority to preempt nearly all forms of state and local drone 
restrictions.50 Although statutory language in section 336 of the 
FMRA that took effect in August 2016 has led the FAA to be 
somewhat more light-handed in regulating recreational drones, the 
FAA continues to assert broad preemptive authority over both 
recreational and commercial drone uses.51  
 
 47. See Craig Whitlock, In Shift, FAA Will Require Drones to Be Registered, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 20, 2015, at A1 (reporting on the FAA’s plan to form a task force to generate 
recommendations on a drone registration system and noting that American consumers 
were expected to purchase more than 700,000 drones in 2015). 
 48. See, e.g., Eli Dourado, The Government Is Rushing out an Ill-Conceived Plan to 
Regulate Consumer Drones, VOX (Nov. 12, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/11
/12/9716350/drones-obama-faa-christmas [https://perma.cc/6NC2-43ZF] (arguing that the 
FAA’s perceived time pressure in getting registration rules into place is “entirely self-
imposed” and noting that, “[i]n the past, courts have rejected the argument that the 
urgent need to take action constitutes good cause for dispensing with notice and comment 
when agencies themselves contributed to that urgency through prolonged inaction”). 
 49. See infra notes 173–79, 240–46 and accompanying text. 
 50. See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, STATE 
AND LOCAL REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 1 
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=84369&omniRss=news
_updatesAoc&cid=101_N_U [https://perma.cc/3M7S-HXQ5] (explaining the FAA’s 
regulatory framework). The December 2015 fact sheet only lists four specific examples of 
drone-related regulations falling within the “police power” of state and local governments: 
(1) requirements that police obtain warrants before using drones for surveillance; (2) 
prohibitions against drone-assisted “voyeurism”; (3) prohibitions against drone-assisted 
hunting or fishing or the use of drones to harass individuals who are hunting or fishing; 
and (4) prohibitions on attaching weapons or firearms to drones. Id. at 3.  
 51. The FAA’s statements have also generated confusion regarding the extent to 
which the agency’s authority over commercial drone use exceeds its authority over 
recreational drone use. Congress has seemingly directed that the FAA treat these two uses 
differently, and yet the agency’s own position on those differences is somewhat unclear. 
Compare Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 
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Given the unsettled nature of this debate, any serious discussion 
about potential state and municipal roles in drone regulation must 
therefore begin with an analysis of the federal preemption questions 
that plague this evolving area of the law. 
A simple example helps to highlight the great importance of 
federal preemption issues to the future of drone regulation. Suppose 
that the city council of Sunnyville, a hypothetical city in the United 
States, adopted an ordinance restricting civilian drone flying over 
certain neighborhoods where drones had been disrupting residents’ 
enjoyment of backyard patios and swimming pools.52 Suppose further 
that, shortly after Sunnyville’s new drone ordinance became effective, 
a large corporation received FAA authorization to make drone 
deliveries throughout much of the United States—including 
Sunnyville—so long as the company followed FAA rules. Then 
suppose this powerful company, relying on this FAA authorization, 
 
42,064, 42,081 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107) (expressly excluding 
recreational drones from having to follow the requirements that small commercial drones 
must follow), with FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 1–3 (describing a regulatory 
framework for the FAA’s authority over drone usage that fails to distinguish between 
commercial and recreational drone use). The FAA’s Small UAS Rule Part 107, for 
example, sets forth extensive rules for the operation of small commercial drones, including 
rules related to registration, pilot certification, visual line-of-sight requirements, and 
operational limitations. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,064–194. Operators who fly drones for recreational use, 
however, can choose whether they want to meet the requirements set forth under Part 107, 
or instead follow the less burdensome section 336 of the FMRA. See FAA Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §	336, 126 Stat. 11, 77–78 (2012); Operation 
and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,064–194. 
Additionally, section 336 of the FMRA expressly prohibits the FAA from “promulgat[ing] 
any rule or regulation” regarding certain recreational drones, while also providing several 
exceptions to this rule, including allowing the FAA to pursue enforcement actions against 
those who “endanger the safety of the national airspace system.” FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012 §	336. The FMRA’s Special Rules for Model Aircraft—which govern 
recreational use, specifically—also require drone operators to follow a community-based 
set of safety guidelines, implying to some degree that Congress does not intend for the 
FAA to preempt local authority over recreational drone use, at least. FAA Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012 §	336. However, the FAA does purport to regulate recreational 
drones under the August 2016 “Registration and Marking Requirements for Small 
Unmanned Aircraft,” seemingly under its authority over air safety. Operation and 
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,064–194. Although 
both Congress and the FAA appear to limit federal regulation of drone use, especially 
recreational drone use, the existence of exceptions allowing for more FAA regulation, the 
promulgation of new FAA rules, and the FAA’s repeated assertions that it holds broad 
authority continue to cause confusion about the extent of state and local government 
authority in this area. 
 52. Such an ordinance is not purely theoretical. Multiple cities across the country have 
contemplated adopting local restrictions on drone use over the past few years, and some 
have already done so. See infra notes 173–79, 240–46 and accompanying text. 
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began flying its drones over parts of Sunnyville where commercial 
drone use was expressly restricted under the city ordinance. Under 
this set of facts, would the FAA’s grant of authorization preempt 
Sunnyville’s local ordinance, enabling the company to fly commercial 
drones freely within areas restricted under the ordinance? And, as a 
matter of policy, should FAA rules trump state or local laws in this 
context? 
Unfortunately, Congress has not provided definitive guidance 
regarding the degree to which FAA rules should preempt state and 
local drone laws. The general case law governing federal implied 
preemption is inconclusive at best.53 Multiple commentators have 
briefly weighed in on federal preemption questions relating to drone 
regulation,54 and the FAA has expressed its own views on the topic,55 
but courts have yet to squarely address these issues. If the FAA 
indeed has broad power to preempt even the hypothetical Sunnyville 
ordinance described above, discussions like those in this Article about 
the potential roles of states and municipalities in drone regulation 
could have limited practical value. Accordingly, this Part includes 
rigorous legal and normative analyses of drone law preemption issues. 
The analyses ultimately suggests that a well-structured federal, state, 
and local drone regulatory system is legally defensible and could be 
far more efficient and effective than a purely federal regime. 
 
 53. Other legal scholars have commented on the complexity and uncertainty 
surrounding federal preemption law. See, e.g., Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful 
Agency in the Supreme Court’s Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 
367 (2011) (“Preemption has become one of the most frequently recurring and perplexing 
public law issues facing the federal courts today.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things 
They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 73 (2013) (observing that “FAA regulation of small, 
low-flying drones does not preclude all state regulation” and that “Congress has not 
created express statutory preemption of laws governing aerial surveillance, and has even 
expressly nodded to exceptions to federal preemption in the field of aviation”); Miller & 
Witt, supra note 45, at 6 (stating that it remains “unclear the extent to which a local agency 
will be able to regulate the manner in which drones are used within their jurisdictions” as a 
result of federal preemption uncertainty); Perritt & Sprague, supra note 41, at 437–39 
(noting that “[d]rones present special challenges to simple extrapolation of traditional 
federal preemption doctrine in the aviation field” and advocating that state and local 
governments “have the power to regulate” drone operations occurring below an airspace 
floor designated by the FAA). 
 55. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 1 (providing information to states and 
localities regarding federal drone regulations and suggesting “careful[] consider[ation] 
prior to any [state] legislative action to ensure that [state laws] are consistent with 
applicable federal safety regulations”). 
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A. Drone Law Preemption: A Legal Perspective 
The FAA clearly possesses a substantial amount of regulatory 
authority over civilian drone activity, at least within “navigable 
airspace” and as the activity relates to “air safety” or “air 
commerce.”56 But, as a legal matter, which aspects of drone regulation 
fall exclusively within the FAA’s control? Tackling this question 
requires analysis under three main preemption theories: express 
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.57 
1.  No Express Federal Preemption 
The federal government’s authority to preempt state and local 
law generally derives from the supremacy clause—a provision in the 
United States Constitution declaring that all federal laws “shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land” and that “the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”58 The most straightforward 
applications of this clause arise when Congress has enacted a federal 
statute with language expressly preempting state or local laws.59 In 
those contexts, the state and local laws at issue are expressly 
preempted: Congress’s preemption language renders them “null, 
void, invalid and inoperative.”60 
Unfortunately, preemption questions can be much more difficult 
and contentious in areas such as civilian drone law, where no express 
federal statutory preemption language exists.61 Congress has not 
 
 56. See 49 U.S.C. §§	40103(b)(1), 40104 (2012) (directing the FAA to “develop plans 
and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use 
of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace” 
and describing the FAA’s authority over air commerce).  
 57. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 767 
n.3 (1994). “Frustration preemption” is a fourth but less frequently acknowledged 
preemption theory, allowing for preemption when “it would unduly frustrate the purposes 
of [a federal] statute to permit concurrent state regulation.” Id. at 808 n.206. Because there 
is no congressional language implying intent to give the FAA sole jurisdiction over every 
aspect of drone regulation, there would seem to be minimal support for applying this 
fourth theory in the context of civilian drones. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §	2. 
 59. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §	1144(a) (2012) (“[T]he provisions of this subchapter and 
subchapter III shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan	.	.	.	.”). 
 60. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279 (1987) (quoting Cal. 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, No. 83-4927R, 1984 WL 943, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 
1984), rev’d, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)).  
 61. See generally 49 U.S.C. §	40103 (lacking express federal preemption language). It 
should be noted that at least one state has already rejected this idea and has enacted 
legislation that expressly prohibits municipal governments from adopting their own local 
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enacted legislation clearly directing that the FAA be the sole 
regulator of every facet of civilian drone activity.62 Language in the 
FRMA does order the agency to develop federal regulations for 
drones; specifically, section 332(a)(1) of the FRMA instructs the 
secretary of transportation—the cabinet officer to whom the FAA 
directly reports—to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely 
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the 
national airspace system.”63 However, neither that language nor any 
other language in the FMRA expressly calls for federal preemption of 
all state and local drone policies.64 
2.  Field Preemption Only Within a Correctly Defined Field 
Given the absence of any express federal statutory language 
preempting state and local drone laws, a more plausible basis for at 
least some federal preemption might be the implied preemption 
theory known as “field preemption.”65 Under the field preemption 
theory, federal laws preempt state and local laws whenever a body of 
federal statutes is so comprehensive that it unambiguously appears 
that Congress intended for federal laws to exclusively “occupy” or 
govern the entire regulatory field at issue.66 The FAA seems to rely 
 
drone ordinances. See MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. §	14-301(b)–(c) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (precluding municipalities from regulating drones and reserving 
all regulatory jurisdiction over drone activity for the state and federal governments). 
 62. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §	332(a)(1), 
126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (directing the secretary of transportation to develop a plan for 
drone operation in national airspace “in consultation with” various federal agencies and 
actors in the drone industry). 
 63. Id. 
 64. At least one other commentator has taken note of the absence of express federal 
preemption provisions precluding state or local drone regulatory activity. See Kaminski, 
supra note 54, at 73. It is worth noting that the FAA included no preemption provision in 
its February 2015 NPRM for civilian drones, in spite of alleged vigorous lobbying for such 
a provision. William V. O’Connor et al., The Small Drones Rule: FAA Takes a Step in the 
Right Direction, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), No. 32, Feb. 18, 2015, at 3 
(observing that the FAA’s February 2015 NPRM for drones did “not propose an express 
preemption provision, despite significant lobbying, including a formal petition filed with 
the FAA, by certain groups for such a provision” and that “[t]his leaves open the 
possibility that state and local governments may attempt to regulate UAS operations 
differently from the manner proposed by FAA in the NPRM”). 
 65. For a useful explanation of the basic difference between express preemption and 
field preemption, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000) (noting 
that, “[e]ven in the absence of an express preemption clause, the [United States Supreme] 
Court sometimes is willing to conclude that a federal statute wholly occupies a particular 
field and withdraws state lawmaking power over that field”). 
 66. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see also Freightliner Corp. v. 
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (stating that “a federal statute implicitly overrides state 
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primarily on field preemption arguments to support its positions 
regarding certain state and local drone regulation within “navigable 
airspace” and cited multiple cases describing that theory in its 
December 2015 fact sheet.67 
Analyzing whether federal laws preempt state or local laws based 
on field preemption generally involves what some commentators have 
characterized as a simple two-prong test.68 The first prong asks 
whether the field in question has traditionally been governed under 
federal law rather than state or local law.69 If it has traditionally been 
governed under federal law, then a court is more likely to find federal 
field preemption.70 The second prong of a typical field preemption 
analysis asks whether Congress intended to leave room for state or 
local governments to supplement federal law in the field.71 If it is 
evident that Congress intended not to leave such room, then field 
preemption is more likely to be found.72 
Regrettably, attempts to apply both prongs of this test in the 
context of civilian drone regulation are quickly complicated by the 
fact that the field at issue is not clearly defined. The FAA clearly 
believes it has extremely broad jurisdiction over those aspects of 
drone regulation that relate directly to protecting the safety and 
efficiency of traditional manned aviation—a field over which the 
agency undisputedly holds broad authority.73 However, several other 
aspects of civilian drone regulation relate more to governing discrete, 
small-scale, localized conflicts between drone operators and 
individual landowners than to protecting conventional aviation.74 
State and local laws aimed solely at addressing these sorts of conflicts 
occurring very close to the ground and far from airports and manned 
 
law	.	.	.	when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy 
a field exclusively”(citing English, 496 U.S. at 78–79))). 
 67. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 2–3. 
 68. See, e.g., Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A 
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 255 (2000) (describing the two-step test 
for field preemption). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70, 73–74 (1941) (holding that federal 
naturalization law preempted Pennsylvania’s naturalization law in part because the federal 
government has always maintained supreme power over matters of foreign affairs). 
 71. See Weiland, supra note 68, at 255. 
 72. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (“Field preemption reflects 
a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel 
to federal standards.” (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984))). 
 73. 49 U.S.C. §	40103(b)(1) (2012) (giving the FAA the authority to implement and 
enforce regulations necessary “to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of 
[navigable] airspace”). 
 74. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. 
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aircraft arguably fall outside any field that Congress intended to 
reserve solely for the FAA.75 
The FAA has effectively taken the position that its field of 
expansive regulatory authority encompasses nearly every activity 
involving objects moving above the ground.76 And at first glance, 
federal legislation providing that the federal government “has 
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States” and instructing 
the FAA to “develop plans and policy for the use of the navigable 
airspace” might seem to support this stance.77 However, in reality, 
Congress has not expressly defined “airspace of the United States.”78 
Therefore, the FAA has conveniently opted to interpret the term to 
encompass every inch of airspace above land, all the way to the 
ground, at least when it comes to air safety regulation.79 These air 
safety interpretations are so broad that, as one administrative law 
judge observed, some are arguing that even the flight of a paper 
airplane or a “toy balsa wood glider” could fall under the agency’s 
jurisdiction.80 For similar reasons, under the FAA’s interpretation of 
its own authority, even Marty McFly’s magnetic hoverboard in the 
movie Back to the Future Part II could qualify as an aircraft flying 
through national airspace, subject to FAA’s ever-reaching 
regulation.81 
 
 75. Although the FAA has authority over more than just traditional manned aviation, 
including authority over navigable airspace, air safety, and the safety of those on the 
ground, these other bases of authority do not justify federal preemption over the kinds of 
localized conflicts this Article suggests are better suited for regulation by state and 
municipal governments. See §	40103(b). 
 76. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 1 (stating that “Congress has 
vested the FAA with authority to regulate the area[] of airspace use, management and 
efficiency, air traffic control, safety, navigational facilities, and aircraft noise at its 
source”). 
 77. §	40103(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 78. See generally id. §	40102 (lacking definition of “airspace of the United States”). 
Congress has defined “navigable airspace,” but the definition does not clearly identify 
which areas are included therein. Id. §	40102(32) (defining “navigable airspace” as 
“airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations	.	.	.	including 
airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft”). 
 79. Busting Myths About the FAA and Manned Aircraft—Update, FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76381 [https://perma.cc/D969-Q774] (last 
modified Mar. 7, 2014, 7:39:39 PM) (debunking myths about the FAA and declaring as 
“fact” that the FAA “has broad authority” and responsibility for the safety of airspace in 
the United States “from the ground up” and stating that some FAA regulations apply 
“irrespective of the altitude at which the aircraft is operating”). 
 80. Pirker, Docket No. CP-217, at 3 (NTSB Mar. 6, 2014) (decisional order), http://
www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/Pirker-CP-217.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N4N-9ZX5]. 
 81. BACK TO THE FUTURE PART II (Universal Pictures 1989). For general 
information about the famed hoverboard appearing in the movie and continued attempts 
to create a fully functional version of the device, see Jonah Bromwich & Daniel Victor, Why 
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By conflating conventional, manned aviation activities with 
essentially all other activities involving objects moving above the 
ground, the FAA is seeking to rationalize its wholesale extension of 
numerous well-established aviation law concepts to drones. Consider, 
for example, the following statement set forth in the agency’s 
December 2015 fact sheet: 
If one or two municipalities enacted ordinances regulating 
[drones] in the navigable airspace and a significant number of 
municipalities followed suit, fractionalized control of the 
navigable airspace could result. In turn, this ‘patchwork quilt’ of 
differing restrictions could severely limit the flexibility of [the] 
FAA in controlling the airspace and flight patterns, and 
ensuring safety and an efficient air traffic flow. A navigable 
airspace free from inconsistent state and local restrictions is 
essential to the maintenance of a safe and sound air 
transportation system.82 
The FAA cites multiple cases involving conventional manned 
aviation to support these statements—statements that are certainly 
applicable to the extent they describe federal restrictions on drone 
flights near airports or at higher altitudes where traditional aircraft 
fly.83 However, the FAA’s rationale becomes far more questionable 
when applied to regulations of small civilian drones traveling very 
short distances, staying low to the ground, and far from ordinary air 
traffic. Local drone restrictions like the Sunnyville ordinance 
described above would not materially impact the FAA’s ability to 
continue controlling conventional air traffic flight patterns or 
maintaining safety near airports or aboard traditional aircraft and 
thus arguably fall outside of the agency’s expansive regulatory field.84 
States’ and municipalities’ long histories of regulating activities in 
the low-altitude airspace where small civilian drones fly cast further 
doubt on the notion that the FAA’s field of broad regulatory 
jurisdiction engulfs that space.85 Consider, for example, the laws 
implicated when a landowner seeks to construct a new building on a 
parcel of land. Municipal zoning ordinances will likely restrict the 
 
a ‘Back to the Future’ Hoverboard Never Took Off, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/business/why-a-back-to-the-future-hoverboard-never-took-off.html. 
 82. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 2. 
 83. Id. (first citing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007); then citing 
French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); then citing Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012); and then citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
504 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1992)). 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 85. See infra Section III.C.2. 
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bulk and height of such a building, limiting the amount of low-altitude 
airspace it may occupy.86 In some cities, local laws regulate building 
contractors’ use of tall cranes within the parcel’s airspace during the 
construction process.87 If portions of the new building ultimately 
protrude into the airspace above neighboring parcels, neighbors may 
have claims under state property law to compel removal of these 
overhang encroachments.88 Furthermore, state or local laws may even 
govern a small aerial fireworks display at the building’s grand opening 
or the flying of small kites above the site.89 Although the FAA has 
some limited regulatory jurisdiction over these sorts of activities, 
including authority over air commerce, that jurisdiction has 
historically extended only so far as is necessary to protect the safety 
and efficiency of the sort of aviation that was regularly occurring 
several decades ago when Congress passed the Federal Aviation 
Act.90 
If there were some compelling policy reason to broadly interpret 
“airspace of the United States” as encompassing low-altitude space, 
then the FAA might have a stronger argument for its expansive 
interpretation of the term. For example, courts have long interpreted 
the terms “navigable waterway” and “waters of the United States” 
quite liberally under the Clean Water Act on the rationale that such 
interpretations advance the nation’s strong public policy interest in 
 
 86. See, e.g., County of San Diego, Cal., Ordinance §§	4600–4631 (May 2016), 
http://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/pds/zoning/z4000.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9Q8E-W8Y4]. In some instances, courts have upheld local governments’ regulatory 
authority to impose height restrictions in the face of FAA preemption challenges, even 
near airports. See, e.g., La Salle Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Cook, 340 N.E.2d 79, 87–88 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1975) (holding that FAA regulations did not preempt a county zoning height 
restriction and specifically stating that “the goals of the federal and local governments are 
different” because “[t]he FAA is concerned with safe air traffic” while “the County is 
concerned with the health, welfare and safety of people who live or work near an 
airfield”).  
 87. See, e.g., Steel Inst. of N.Y. v. City of New York, 832 F. Supp. 2d 310, 325, 327, 331 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that New York City’s crane use restrictions aimed at protecting 
the public were not preempted by federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
regulations related to the use of cranes on jobsites to the extent that such laws were more 
strict than federal ones and were aimed at protecting the public), aff’d, 716 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 88. See generally L.C. Warden, Annotation, Mandatory Injunction to Compel 
Removal of Encroachments by Adjoining Landowner, 28 A.L.R.2d 679, §	18 (1953) 
(summarizing state court decisions ordering removal of overhanging wall encroachments).  
 89. 14 C.F.R. §	101.1(a)(2)–(3) (2015) (excluding aerial fireworks displays and kites 
weighing less than five pounds from general FAA regulations). 
 90. See 49 U.S.C. §§	40103, 40104 (2012) (describing the FAA’s authority over air 
commerce). The widespread existence of local building setbacks and height restrictions is 
one example of evidence of this limitation on the FAA’s exclusive jurisdiction over low-
altitude airspace. See infra Section III.C.2.  
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aggressively addressing water pollution at its source.91 In contrast, 
there is no compelling policy justification for expanding the scope of 
“airspace of the United States” to include even the airspace below 
our noses. 
It seems far more plausible that Congress intended for “airspace 
of the United States” to only encompass space regularly involved in 
manned air flight—airspace near airports or situated at least 500 feet 
above ground in most places.92 That sort of interpretation seems far 
more consistent with the Supreme Court’s declaration in the famous 
case United States v. Causby93 that a landowner owns “at least as 
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in 
connection with the land.”94 In sum, the long history of state and local 
laws regulating within low-altitude airspace and the lack of evidence 
that Congress intended for the FAA to exclusively control all 
activities in that space call into question the notion that a field 
preemption theory justifies broad preemption of laws like the 
Sunnyville drone ordinance described above.95 The Supreme Court’s 
general hesitancy to find field preemption only further weakens these 
arguments.96 
Fortunately, the FAA appears to be beginning to recognize that 
there are aspects of drone regulation that do not or should not fall 
within its expansive jurisdiction. When the FAA issued its long-
anticipated Final Rule on Operation and Certification of Small 
 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132–33 
(1985) (finding that “[p]rotection of aquatic ecosystems, Congress recognized, demanded 
broad federal authority to control pollution” at the source of discharge and thus holding 
that Congress purposely defined “navigable waters” broadly under the Clean Water Act 
with an intent to “regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed ‘navigable’ 
under the classical understanding of [the] term”); see also 33 U.S.C. §§	1251–1387 (West, 
Westlaw through P.L. 114-244). It should be noted that the debate over precisely how 
broadly to interpret “navigable waters” under various federal statutes rages on. See 
generally Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the 
“Navigable Waters” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,548 
(2015) (providing a recent summary of courts’ activity in this area). 
 92. See 49 U.S.C. §	40102(32) (defining “navigable airspace” as “airspace above the 
minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this subpart and subpart III of 
this part, including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of 
aircraft”); 14 C.F.R. §	91.119(b)–(c) (2016) (defining the minimum safe altitude for aircraft 
operations as 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle near “congested areas” and 500 feet 
above the surface of “other than congested areas”). 
 93. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 94. Id. at 264. 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 96. See Nelson, supra note 65, at 227 (noting that the United States Supreme Court 
“has grown increasingly hesitant to read implicit field-preemption clauses into federal 
statutes”). 
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems in June of 2016, it intentionally excluded 
a broad federal preemption provision from its pages.97 In the FAA’s 
published “Discussion of the Final Rule,” the agency acknowledged 
its decision not to include preemption language: 
The FAA is not persuaded that including a preemption 
provision in the final rule is warranted at this time. Preemption 
issues involving small UAS necessitate a case-specific analysis 
that is not appropriate in a rule of general applicability. 
Additionally, certain legal aspects concerning small UAS use 
may be best addressed at the State or local level.98 
The FAA’s conscious constraint in its final rule is a promising sign 
that even the agency itself is beginning to acknowledge that not all 
drone activities do or should fall within its regulatory power. 
3.  Very Limited Conflict Preemption 
In addition to field preemption, another set of rules, categorized 
in this Article as “conflict preemption”99 theories, provide another 
conceivable ground for implied federal preemption of some state and 
local drone laws.100 Establishing conflict preemption generally 
requires a showing that it would be “impossible for a private party to 
comply with both state and federal requirements” or that the state or 
local law in question “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”101 
Conflict preemption theories could certainly provide a basis for 
federal preemption of some limited categories of state or local drone 
 
 97. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 42,064, 42,064–194 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107). 
 98. Id. at 42,194. 
 99. See Nelson, supra note 65, at 227–28 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 
79 (1990)) (defining “conflict preemption” and explaining that “even if a federal statute 
contains no express preemption clause, and even if it does not impliedly occupy a 
particular field, it preempts state law with which it ‘actually conflicts’	”).  
 100. Id. Some commentators make a distinction between “conflict preemption” and 
“obstacle preemption,” which is also sometimes termed “frustration of purpose” 
preemption. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 727, 739 (2008). Others categorize these two similar types of preemption together. 
See id. (explaining that “[s]ome writers collapse [conflict preemption and frustration of 
purpose preemption] into one, which they tend to call conflict preemption—the point 
being that the difference between conflict and frustration of purpose relates only to how 
sharp the tension is between federal and state law” (citation omitted)). For simplicity, and 
because the distinction does not seem material enough to warrant separation in this 
instance, this Article embraces the latter approach and treats these two varieties of 
preemption theory as one in the same. 
 101. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (quoting Freightliner Corp. 
v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)). 
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regulations.102 For example, if the FAA were to establish uniform 
nationwide manufacturing requirements for new drones, a state or 
local regulation calling for different drone features might well be 
unenforceable based on a conflict preemption rationale.103 Similar 
federal manufacturing standards serve valuable functions in other 
industries, enabling manufacturers to design products that are salable 
in every state.104 
However, it is doubtful that conflict preemption would be 
grounds for broad FAA preemption of local drone use restrictions 
comparable to the Sunnyville ordinance described above.105 Such local 
drone ordinances would not necessarily stand as obstacles to the 
FAA’s objective of protecting the safety and efficiency of manned 
flight; drone operators who comply with federal drone restrictions 
and keep their devices at low altitudes and far from airports and 
helicopters could simultaneously comply with Sunnyville’s additional 
restrictions on where or when drones may fly. And the “patchwork 
quilt” of local restrictions that might result from allowing such local 
drone laws would arguably be no different than the degree of local 
variation that has long existed in automobile traffic laws.106 Contrary 
to Amazon’s recent assertions,107 most commercial drone flying 
involves short flights that are less likely to routinely cross interstate 
boundaries and do not necessarily qualify as inherently interstate 
 
 102. See O’Connor et al., supra note 64, at 3 (stating that “[a]bsent an express 
preemption provision in the [FAA’s] final rules [regarding drones],	.	.	.	state and local 
regulation would not be foreclosed at the threshold, but would instead have to be analyzed 
under existing conflict preemption principles on a case-by-case basis” (citation omitted)). 
 103. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 3 (drawing similar conclusions and 
stating that state or local laws “[m]andating equipment or training for UAS related to 
aviation safety such as geo-fencing would likely be preempted”). 
 104. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1561–63 (2007) (describing “federal 
requirements concerning product design or engineering” as “[m]ore common and more 
defensible” than most other forms of federal preemption). 
 105. See supra text accompanying note 52.  
 106. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 2 (asserting that a “	‘patchwork 
quilt’ of differing restrictions [on drones in navigable airspace] could severely limit the 
flexibility of FAA in controlling the airspace and flight patterns, and ensuring safety and 
an efficient air traffic flow”). 
 107. Hearing on Drones: The Next Generation of Commerce? Before the Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 6 (2015), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content
/uploads/2015/06/Amazon-Misener-HOGR-Testimony-Pkg-6-17-15-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X3Y4-HYLB] (testimony of Paul Misener, Vice President for Global Public Policy, 
Amazon.com) (arguing that states and localities should be precluded from restricting the 
flights of FAA-authorized drones “given the interstate nature of commercial [drone] 
operations”). 
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activities.108 Neither conflict preemption nor any other preemption 
argument has precluded state or municipal regulations of automobile 
driving, which routinely involves trips of a couple of hundred miles or 
more on a single tank of gas.109 Accordingly, claims that express 
preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption theories justify 
broad preemption in the drone law context seem tenuous at best. 
B. Drone Law Preemption: A Normative Analysis 
Given the unsettled state of legal questions surrounding federal 
preemption of state and local drone law, it is worthwhile to conduct a 
“functional,” or normative, analysis of these issues as well.110 Over the 
years, legal academics have identified several types of situations in 
which federal preemption of state or local law tends to promote 
favorable policy outcomes.111 They have likewise described multiple 
situations in which it tends to be more advantageous to preserve state 
or local lawmaking authority against preemption challenges.112 As 
described below, this academic literature suggests that an optimal 
regulatory system for drones would allocate regulatory authority 
among federal, state, and local governments. 
1.  Regulatory Floors Versus Regulatory Ceilings 
The distinction between “floor” preemption and “ceiling” 
preemption is particularly useful in examining the policy implications 
of drone law preemption. Federal regulatory floors are federal laws 
that create a baseline level of regulation, preempting any state or 
local laws that are less stringent than the federal standards.113 For 
example, federal regulations generally require that children aged 
 
 108. See Matt Burns, Parrot’s Newest Drone Packs a Serious Camera, Extreme Range, 
TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/05/11/parrots-newest-drone-
packs-a-serious-camera-extreme-range/ [https://perma.cc/53SY-K88C] (describing a new 
drone model’s two-kilometer range as “extreme”). 
 109. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 110. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1223 (2004) (“Functional analysis supplements consideration of text, 
history, and precedent and seeks solutions to difficult doctrinal questions by asking what 
makes sense from a policy perspective.”). 
 111. See infra Section III.A. 
 112. See generally Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the 
State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 351 (2012) 
(providing a more thorough summary of goals favoring and disfavoring preemption). 
 113. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1554 (defining federal regulatory floors as laws that 
“preclude less stringent state and local regulation, but allow for additional and more 
stringent regulation”). 
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thirteen and younger wear life jackets when aboard recreational 
boats—a regulatory floor that creates a minimum standard, applicable 
in all fifty states.114 However, this federal requirement does not 
preclude state governments from imposing more stringent laws that 
regulate beyond the federal floor and require life jackets for older 
passengers, as some states have done.115 Floor preemption approaches 
can be appealing from a public policy perspective because they give 
states and municipalities flexibility to impose additional rules based 
on local needs and preferences, and the ability to experiment with 
innovative new regulatory strategies.116 In Professor William Buzbee’s 
words, the flexible dynamic achievable through federal floors can 
offer distinct advantages, preserving the “benefits of multiple 
regulatory voices, protections, and diverse regulatory modalities.”117 
Floor preemption is often contrasted with regulatory “ceiling” 
preemption118 or “federal unitary choice preemption.”119 This less 
common and more controversial category of preemption largely 
precludes states or localities from imposing supplemental regulations 
on an activity or industry.120 There are certainly situations in which 
nationally uniform rules offer such sizable benefits that ceiling 
 
 114. See 33 C.F.R. §	175.15(c) (2015). 
 115. See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 26.01.30.050.01(f) (2015) (“Children fourteen 
(14) years of age and younger, onboard vessels nineteen (19) feet or less, must wear an 
approved flotation device when the vessel is underway.”). 
 116. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (popularizing the “laboratories of democracy” theory, in which a “single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[] and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”). 
 117. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1555. 
 118. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective 
on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 583 (2008) (contrasting regulatory floors and ceilings); 
Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 1283, 1303 (2013) (suggesting that “absent clear evidence of a congressional purpose 
to adopt unitary standards or an obvious conflict or obstacle to a clearly defined 
regulatory program, courts and agencies should generally favor floor preemption over 
ceiling preemption in the context of energy statutes”); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands 
on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change 
Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 736 (2010) (describing the advantages of regulatory 
floors over ceiling preemption). This floor-ceiling dichotomy has grown particularly 
commonplace among scholars in the environmental law arena, often citing Professor 
William Buzbee’s writings on the topic. See, e.g., Glicksman & Levy, supra, at 258; Alice 
Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 390, 451 (2014); Rossi & Hutton, supra, at 1288, 1301. 
 119. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1558 (observing that the term “ceiling” can be a 
misnomer when describing preemption rules that effectively preclude state and local 
regulation). 
 120. Id. at 1559. 
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preemption is a useful and appropriate regulatory tool.121 However, in 
many instances, ceiling preemption approaches can unjustifiably 
displace state and local government regulations that were far better 
tailored to local needs and preferences.122 For example, a 2010 case 
held that certain federal manufacturing standards for air conditioners 
preempted Albuquerque’s more environmentally responsible 
standards, highlighting the potential hazards of this sort of 
preemption.123 Federal ceiling preemption arguments can provide an 
avenue for powerful industry stakeholders to lobby for and secure 
self-serving, excessively lenient federal laws that shield them from 
more stringent state or local regulations.124 
Federal ceiling regulations are particularly problematic when 
applied to inherently local activities. For instance, the fireworks 
industry and fireworks fanatics might heartily favor a federal law 
allowing consumers in all fifty states to legally use small aerial 
fireworks and preempting state and local restrictions on such use. 
Such a law would give companies operating within that industry 
broad license to operate throughout the country and would spare 
them from having to worry about more restrictive state or local laws. 
However, such an approach would likely be disadvantageous from a 
public policy perspective. Among other things, it would prohibit 
states and municipalities from tailoring fireworks laws to suit their 
own unique circumstances. Such flexibility is important in the case of 
consumer firework regulation because the scope and severity of 
fireworks’ impacts likely varies tremendously based on local factors 
such as population density or localized drought conditions.125 
 
 121. See infra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (alluding to some of the possible 
policy justifications for regulatory ceilings, including establishing nationwide uniform 
standards and protecting national security interests and assets). 
 122. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1569. In his article on the topic, Professor Buzbee 
adds that unitary federal choice preemption strategies are “likely to be a disaster” from a 
social welfare perspective and are “particularly vulnerable to regulatory failure.” Id. at 
1597, 1599. 
 123. See Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque, 835 
F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (D.N.M. 2010). 
 124. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: 
The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1505–06 (2007) (“[W]hat will 
industry demand from Congress? It will demand a federal standard that preempts 
inconsistent state regulation and eliminates regulatory uncertainty. Uniformity is not 
enough, however. Industry will also try to undercut the most aggressive state standards by 
seeking a lower federal ceiling.”). 
 125. See, e.g., Tom Moore, Amid Drought and Wildfires, Fourth of July Fireworks Are 
Banned in Parts of West, WEATHER.COM (June 30, 2016, 5:46 PM), https://weather.com
/news/news/fireworks-ban-hot-dry-fires-west [https://perma.cc/X3G7-PVKT] (describing how 
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Accordingly, no federal fireworks law creating this sort of undesirable 
ceiling preemption exists. Instead, the federal government has 
adopted regulatory floors for consumer fireworks and allows states 
and municipalities to independently determine whether and how to 
impose more stringent restrictions.126 
2.  Justifiable Regulatory Floors 
How might this floor versus ceiling distinction inform the present 
preemption debate over civilian drone regulation? First, it is worth 
noting that several types of federal regulatory floors relating to 
drones seem easily justifiable from a policy perspective. Consider, for 
instance, FAA regulations requiring that civilian drones stay below a 
certain altitude and away from airports and helicopters.127 So long as 
these sorts of regulations leave room for states and localities to 
impose additional drone use restrictions, they exemplify the 
regulatory floor approach. Such rules further the FAA’s 
congressionally mandated objectives of promoting the safety and 
efficiency of manned aviation.128 However, they also preserve the 
ability of states and localities to craft more stringent drone use rules 
based on local needs. 
Federal regulatory floors could also be justifiable as a way for the 
FAA and other federal agencies to protect national interests and 
assets against drone-related threats. For example, such agencies are 
likely justified in imposing federal restrictions on drone activities near 
or above national parks;129 Washington, D.C.;130 and critical national 
 
drought conditions in the western United States in the summer of 2016 prompted many 
state and local governments to impose special fireworks restrictions). 
 126. See 35 C.J.S. Explosives §	11 (2009) (stating that a “county ordinance regulating 
storage and use of explosives is not preempted by federal statutes regulating explosives, 
even if the ordinance imposes more stringent requirements” (citing S. Blasting Servs., Inc. 
v. Wilkes Cty., 162 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462 (W.D.N.C. 2001), aff’d, 288 F.3d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 
2002))). 
 127. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 42,064, 42,211 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107); see also Fly for 
Fun, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/model_aircraft/ [https://perma.cc
/VDS2-TWUR] (last modified July 21, 2016, 12:05:25 PM) (providing further details on 
the FAA’s restrictions on flying drones and model aircrafts). 
 128. See 49 U.S.C. §	40103(b)(1) (2012); infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text 
(describing the FAA’s congressional mandates). 
 129. See Mark Berman, National Park Service Bans Drone Use in All National Parks, 
WASH. POST (June 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014
/06/20/national-park-service-bans-drone-use-in-all-national-parks/ [https://perma.cc/92SW-
K4D5] (stating that the National Park Service banned drones in all of its parks due to 
“concerns about the negative impact that flying unmanned aircraft is having in parks”). 
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security sites. If a city ordinance contained more lenient provisions 
that expressly authorized drone activity in one of these nationally 
important areas, it would be appropriate for federal restrictions to 
preempt those ordinance provisions. 
3.  Justifiable Regulatory Ceilings 
Federal regulatory ceilings that preclude certain types of state or 
local drone laws may also be justifiable in some contexts. As 
mentioned, a ceiling preemption approach may be necessary to 
preserve nationwide uniformity in drone manufacturing or 
performance standards—an area of drone law where such 
standardization offers substantial efficiency advantages.131 Federal 
laws already mandate certain specified features of passenger aircraft 
sold within the United States, sparing manufacturers from having to 
meet fifty different sets of standards.132 For similar reasons, 
comparable nationwide standardization in the drone context would 
help to reduce manufacturing costs and could thereby benefit 
consumers. Federal uniform drone tracking and registration 
requirements would likewise offer distinct policy advantages and 
justify preemption of conflicting state or local laws.133 
4.  The Advantages of Greater State and Local Involvement 
However, outside of those limited areas where federal regulation 
is justified lie several other aspects of civilian drone activity that have 
distinctly local impacts and thus warrant at least some localized 
 
 130. See 14 C.F.R. §	93.341(a) (2016) (prohibiting flying aircrafts over the Washington, 
D.C., without FAA authorization); see also FAA: Washington DC is a No Drone Zone, 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June 30, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=
83267 [https://perma.cc/98C5-T9AA] (stating that restrictions on the airspace around 
Washington, D.C., establish a “national defense airspace” for homeland security reasons). 
 131. It should be noted that even unitary federal choice preemption based on this 
“nationwide standardization” rationale can generate undesirable policy outcomes. The 
Energy Policy Conservation Act (“EPCA”) and its capacity to preempt more stringent 
energy efficiency requirements under state and local building codes illustrates this risk. 
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited: 
Federalism, Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 335, 356 (2010) (describing how the EPCA “presents potential roadblocks to 
municipal green building codes that include increased appliance efficiency standards”). 
 132. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §	23.1 (2016) (establishing federal airworthiness standards for 
different types of airplanes). See generally Thomas N. Tarnay, Aircraft Designs Subjected 
to FAA Special Certification Review—Mitsubishi MU-2 and Beechcraft Bonanza: The Role 
of the SCR in Aircraft Design Certification and Implications on Federal Preemption, 62 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 591, 597–98, 601–07 (1996) (providing a useful overview of the federal 
standards for the design, production, and maintenance of manned aircraft). 
 133. See infra Section III.A.2. 
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regulation. A ceiling preemption approach, like the one suggested in 
the FAA’s December 2015 fact sheet, is difficult to justify from a 
policy perspective; it would preclude states and municipalities from 
imposing supplemental drone use restrictions that address these 
inherently local issues. 
Simple analogies to other areas of the law help to emphasize this 
point. There is no federal land use administration equivalent to the 
FAA through which citizens in every city in the country must seek 
approval for real estate development.134 Nor is there a federal 
automobile driving administration that manages traffic flows and sets 
speed limits for every road in all fifty states.135 The nation’s federal 
system wisely allows for state and local officials, which tend to have 
greater geographic proximity to and information about the 
predominantly local impacts of these sorts of activities than federal 
officials, to be the primary regulators of these activities.136 Like land 
development and automobile driving, civilian drone activity’s impacts 
can vary greatly by location and thus benefit from the precision 
available through localized governance. Entrusting regulatory 
authority to subnational governments in these areas also creates 
“laboratories of democracy”—a vast array of uniquely situated 
policymakers brainstorming and experimenting with various 
approaches to drone regulation on a relatively small scale.137 This 
experimentation can be a valuable tool for accelerating policy 
innovation in areas—including the civilian drone industry—that 
involve new and rapidly changing technologies. 
III.  ENVISIONING A COORDINATED FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 
DRONE REGULATORY SYSTEM 
For the aforementioned reasons, involving states and 
municipalities in the regulation of civilian drones seems both legally 
 
 134. See generally 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING 
AND PLANNING §	1:9, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (stating that the authority to 
enact zoning ordinances and the manner in which they may be enacted are delegated to 
local governments). 
 135. See generally Highway Safety Laws by State, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY 
ASS’N, http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/bystate/ [https://perma.cc/GJ5X-7Z8V] (providing 
a listing of automobile administration agencies and highway safety laws by state).  
 136. See, e.g., Road Rules, N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.ncdot.gov/programs
/ghsp/ [https://perma.cc/2KM6-8DXM] (listing highway safety laws that drivers in North 
Carolina must follow, including seat belt and litter laws). 
 137. See New St. Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “one of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[] and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”). 
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defensible and normatively advantageous. But which specific areas of 
drone regulation seem best suited for implementation by the federal 
government, and which would be better implemented at lower levels 
of government? As highlighted in this Part of the Article, some 
specific areas of the civilian drone industry are best suited for 
regulation at the federal level, the state level, and the local level, 
respectively. 
The existing federal, state, and local regulatory regime for land 
development offers a useful starting point for developing a 
coordinated structure to regulate civilian drones. At the federal level, 
a handful of federal standards regulate such matters as the protection 
of endangered species and their habitats to prevent states from 
engaging in a “race to the bottom.”138 Above this federal regulatory 
floor, state laws govern numerous other land development issues such 
as the allocation of property rights in land and the protection of 
wetlands.139 Municipal governments then operate atop both the 
federal and state floors, exercising wide discretion in determining 
precisely where and under what conditions various types of land 
development may occur within their jurisdictions.140 Most states’ 
zoning enabling acts delegate land use regulatory and zoning 
authority to local governments, integrating municipalities into a 
broader regulatory system in which each level of government plays a 
role.141 This multi-layered regulatory approach seems to have 
governed land development relatively well for several decades. 
What might a corollary regulatory structure look like for drones? 
The following Sections identify the major elements of a 
comprehensive drone regulatory scheme that seem most appropriate 
for implementation at the federal, state, and local levels. 
 
 138. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§	1531–1544 (2015); see also Rancho 
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that the 
“[a]pplication of the [Endangered Species Act] to habitat degradation has a further impact 
on interstate commerce by removing the incentives for states ‘to adopt lower standards of 
endangered species protection in order to attract development,’ thereby preventing a 
destructive ‘race to the bottom’	” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 
F.3d 1041, 1049, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1997))). 
 139. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, §	40 (West, Westlaw through ch. 175 of 
the 2016 Legis. Sess.); see also ENVTL. L. INST., STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, 
TRENDS & MODEL APPROACHES 9–36 (Mar. 2008), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files
/eli-pubs/d18__06.pdf [https://perma.cc/645B-CM8W]. 
 140. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 388 (1977) (stating that there are few legal doctrines for 
“limiting the range of municipal discretion”). 
 141. See generally RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, §	1:9 (stating that the authority to 
enact zoning ordinances and the manner in which they may be enacted are delegated to 
local governments). 
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A. Drone Laws Most Suitable for the Federal Government 
Federal regulators unquestionably have a vital role to play in 
regulating civilian drone activity in the United States. Having served 
as the nation’s chief aviation regulator for nearly a century, the FAA 
has unparalleled resources and expertise in several areas related to 
drone use.142 Additionally, the agency’s position within the federal 
government could enable it to facilitate valuable nationwide 
uniformity within certain aspects of drone regulation. 
1.  Uniform Design and Performance Standards 
As already suggested, federal regulations would be the most 
efficient and effective way to establish uniform drone manufacturing 
standards and specifications that are enforceable in all fifty states. 
Much like the existing federal performance and safety standards for 
automobiles, a set of uniform drone performance and safety 
standards would give civilian drone manufacturers certainty and 
clarity regarding the specifications their products must meet to be 
eligible for sale anywhere in the country.143 Courts have long 
recognized that a compelling need for uniform, nationwide rules can 
be reason enough to vest regulatory authority over certain activities 
solely with the federal government.144 Nationwide drone 
manufacturing standards, which would prevent the formation of a 
 
 142. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 9,544, 9,545 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (purporting the FAA’s “experience with the 
certification, exemption, and [Certificate of Waiver or Authorization] process” to be part 
of the basis for its authority to regulate non-recreational drone use); see also Berger, supra 
note 40, at 965–71 (describing the FAA’s formation and the considerable scope of its 
power).  
 143. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 200–01 
(2015) (suggesting that the FAA could promulgate federal manufacturing standards for 
civilian drones comparable to federal motor vehicle manufacturing and safety standards). 
See generally 49 C.F.R. §	571 (2015) (setting forth federal manufacturing standards for 
automobiles). 
 144. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1890) (“Where the subject matter 
[to be regulated] requires a uniform system as between the States, the power controlling it 
is vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot be encroached upon by the States	.	.	.	.”). 
Commentators have also noted the potential advantages of federal regulatory activity in 
contexts in which national uniformity is particularly important. See Alan N. Greenspan, 
The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach to 
Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1049 (1988) (arguing for federal rulemaking in 
instances “[w]hen national uniformity facilitates interstate transactions in a way that 
individual state regulation cannot”). 
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varied patchwork of state-level standards, would seemingly fall well 
within this principle.145 
For example, federal drone manufacturing standards might 
someday require that all new drones have collision avoidance or 
“sense and avoid” systems, enabling the devices to detect other 
physical objects and automatically adjust course to avoid them.146 
Such standards might also require return-to-home or other lost-link 
emergency response features that preprogram drones to respond in 
safe ways if they lose a wireless connection with their operator,147 or 
anti-hacking software to help prevent third parties from using 
counterfeit electromagnetic signals to hijack the devices mid-flight.148 
Federal drone manufacturing standards might also eventually 
require that all drones made available for sale in the United States 
include software and hardware features to ensure their compatibility 
with a nationally-standardized geofence system. A growing number of 
drone manufacturers—including DJI, the world’s largest civilian 
drone producer—already embed geofence software into many of their 
drones.149 This software uses GPS technologies to create invisible 
“fences” that prevent the company’s drones from flying into the 
 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 131 (acknowledging that there is a need for 
uniform nationwide rules to regulate drones). 
 146. At least one major drone manufacturer has already developed a “sense and 
avoid” system for one of its newer drones. Ben Popper, DJI Just Released Its First Drone 
That Can See and Avoid Obstacles, THE VERGE (June 8, 2015, 9:45 AM), http://www
.theverge.com/2015/6/8/8745415/dji-guidance-system-matrice-100-sense-avoid [https://
perma.cc/XWX9-JLXX] (describing drone manufacturer DJI’s new drone guidance 
system as a “combination of ultrasonic sensors and stereo cameras that allow the drone to 
detect objects up to 65 feet (20 meters) away and keep your aircraft at a preconfigured 
distance”). 
 147. See generally Jack Nicas, What Happens When Your Drone Escapes, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 9, 2014, at B1 (providing information on technological issues with drones such as the 
drones losing connections with their operators, and discussing the industry efforts to 
address these problems through new functions like return to home features). 
 148. See Christian de Looper, Drones Now Big Hacking Target; First Drone Malware 
Identified, TECH TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles
/30634/20150204/drone-hacking-next-big-security-concern.htm [https://perma.cc/MU8K
-7R9V] (reporting that hacking is a growing issue with drones as there is a “thriving 
community of drone hackers[,]” and that there are “several open source projects available 
such as Skyjack which use[] your drone to take over the drones around it”). 
 149. See Tim Moynihan, Things Will Get Messy If We Don’t Start Wrangling Drones 
Now, WIRED (Jan. 30, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/things-will-get-
messy-if-we-dont-start-wrangling-drones-now/ [https://perma.cc/ZZK7-V69U] (stating that 
multiple drone manufacturers have put geofencing systems into place); see also Nick 
Lavars, DJI Launches New Software to Block Drones Wandering into Dangerous Areas, 
NEW ATLAS (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.gizmag.com/dji-drone-software-geofencing/41123/ 
[https://perma.cc/5SEB-SDCA] (describing DJI’s geofencing software). 
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airspace near thousands of airports across the world.150 When a drone 
approaches a “geofenced” area, software within the drone 
automatically reduces the drone’s power and prevents it from 
entering the restricted space.151 Wireless signals can even remotely 
update drones’ geofence software from time to time to revise or add 
new geofenced areas.152 Uniform laws established by the federal 
government could most easily ensure that all new drones sold in the 
country were compatible with such a nationwide system.153 
As a legal matter, rules establishing drone performance and 
geofence compatibility standards would likewise seem well within the 
FAA’s regulatory jurisdiction because of the agency’s congressional 
mandate to protect the safety of aircraft.154 Among other things, 
preserving such safety involves reducing the risk that a civilian drone 
will fly into other objects in the air. It also involves preventing drones 
from flying near airports or within “navigable airspace”—the space 
more than 500 feet above the ground in most places that serves as a 
sort of federal public highway for manned air travel.155 FAA rules 
 
 150. See Brian Fung, You Won’t Be Able to Fly This Hugely Popular Drone in D.C. 
Much Longer, Thanks to That White House Crash, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/28/a-simple-software-update-could-have-
prevented-a-drone-from-buzzing-the-white-house/ [https://perma.cc/A9RS-RD2F] (reporting 
that drone manufacturer DJI’s geofence database already blocks its newer drones from 
3,500 airports and that the company is working to expand the database to cover more than 
10,000 airports around the world). 
 151. See id. (stating that when a drone is within 1.5 miles of a geofenced area, it will 
automatically be grounded and unable to fly). 
 152. See, e.g., DJI Introduces New Geofencing System for Its Drones, DJI (Nov. 18, 
2015), https://www.dji.com/newsroom/news/dji-fly-safe-system [https://perma.cc/XG8V
-NK4C] (stating that for DJI manufactured drones, updated information on drone flight 
restrictions will be sent to DJI drone operators using the DJI GO application). 
 153. At least one congressman has publicly advocated for mandatory federal geofence 
features. See Jake Swearingen, 1 Million Drones Will Be Sold This Christmas, and the FAA 
Is Terrified, POPULAR MECHANICS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.popularmechanics
.com/flight/drones/news/a17535/the-faa-is-terrified-that-1-million-drones-will-be-sold-
this-christmas/ [https://perma.cc/985G-DZPQ] (quoting Oregon Congressman Peter 
DeFazio who has argued that small civilian drones “should be set up so they can’t be sold 
unless they’re geo-fenced for altitude and perimeters”). 
 154. See 49 U.S.C. §	40103(b)(1) (2012) (stating that the FAA shall develop policies “to 
ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace”). 
 155. Id. §	40103(32) (defining “navigable airspace” as “airspace above the minimum 
altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this subpart and subpart III of this part, 
including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft”); see also 
Major Walter S. King, The Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of Air Force Aircraft 
Overflights and the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Program, 43 A.F. L. REV. 197, 
199 (1997) (observing that Congress established navigable airspace in order to “provide 
the public with rights to the airspace above the United States[,]” and stating that the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority determined the “minimum safe altitudes of flight,” and therefore 
the navigable airspace, “to be 500 feet above ground level”).  
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requiring that all new drones have the basic features described above 
and be compatible with a nationwide geofence system could do much 
to help further those congressionally mandated goals by making it 
easier to keep drones out of restricted areas. 
2.  Federal Drone Registration and Tracking Systems 
The federal government is likewise well-positioned to establish 
drone registration and tracking software requirements capable of 
enabling law enforcement officers and others on the ground to 
identify the owners of airborne drones. Many civilian drones can fly a 
considerable distance away from their operators, making it difficult to 
identify operators of the devices while they are in flight.156 Databases 
already enable patrol officers on roads to retrieve information on 
licensed motor vehicles, including out-of-state vehicles, using license 
plate information.157 However, since many civilian drones are much 
smaller than cars and can fly hundreds of feet above the ground, any 
aluminum license plate mounted on such a drone would be difficult 
for observers on the ground to read.158 Fortunately, federal drone 
registration requirements and a national, GPS-supported tracking 
system could eventually allow patrol officers and others throughout 
the nation to quickly access identifying information for any drone. 
Legislators in the United Kingdom recently proposed similar 
electronic identification requirements for drones.159 In December of 
2015, the FAA introduced its own web-based national registration 
 
 156. See Michael Zhang, FAA Testing Tech That Locates Drone Owners Flying 
Illegally Near Airports, PETAPIXEL (Oct. 8, 2015), http://petapixel.com/2015/10/08/faa-
testing-tech-that-locates-drone-owners-flying-illegally-near-airports/ [https://perma.cc/5N63-
276E] (stating that one of the FAA’s biggest challenges is locating drone operators, and 
describing technology that could “pinpoint exactly where the operator is located while the 
drone is in the air”). 
 157. See, e.g., License Plate Search, WIS. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://trust.dot.state.wi.us
/pinq/pinqservlet?whoami=pinqp1 [https://perma.cc/228B-7VYY] (providing a publicly 
searchable database for motor vehicle license plates).  
 158. See Tom Simonite, License Plates for Drones Could Make Rogue Operators 
Accountable, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s
/540391/license-plates-for-drones-could-make-rogue-operators-accountable/ [https://perma
.cc/74SV-WK5E] (describing potential problems with attaching license plates to drones 
such as the license plates only being visible to the naked eye if they are less than 100 
meters away). 
 159. See Robert Wall, U.K. Politicians Call for Tracking of Drone Flights, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 4, 2015, 7:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-calls-for-tracking-of-drone-flights
-1425513662 (reporting that Parliament members sought new drone tracking system 
requirements partly as a way to “avoid having safety concerns stifle an industry considered 
to have huge potential for job creation”). 
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system for all operators of drones weighing more than 250 grams.160 
Under the new system, registrants for both commercial and 
recreational drones must obtain a unique registration or serial 
number and affix the number directly onto their drones.161 
Registration requires providing name, address, and contact 
information, making it easier to identify drone owners and operators, 
as well.162 Although this approach does not make it possible to 
identify owners or operators of drones while they are flying high in 
the air, it could be a valuable first step toward such a system. 
3.  Restrictions That Protect Federal Assets and Interests 
For the reasons described above,163 there are also compelling 
legal and policy justifications for federal restrictions on drone activity 
above or near nationally important sites and security infrastructure. 
The National Park Service (“NPS”) has already imposed restrictions 
to address growing concerns about drone uses within national parks. 
In 2014, NPS announced a temporary ban on drones flying above 
eighty-four million acres of NPS-controlled waters and lands.164 These 
restrictions fall squarely within the agency’s regulatory authority, 
given its legislatively created role as the nation’s protector of these 
scenic and historic sites.165 For homeland security purposes, the FAA 
has likewise declared Washington, D.C. and all space within a thirty-
mile radius of the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to be 
a “No Drone Zone” in which drone flying is greatly limited.166 
For analogous reasons, the FAA or other federal agencies could 
be well justified in restricting drone flying near national borders, on 
national public lands, near nuclear energy or military facilities, or in 
the vicinity of other important national security areas. Given the 
inherently national nature of the interests protected under such 
 
 160. Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 78,593, 78,646 (Dec. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 48). 
 161. See id. at 78,647–48. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See supra Section II.B. 
 164. See Mike M. Ahlers, National Park Service Bans Drones over Safety, Noise 
Worries, CNN (June 21, 2014, 11:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/20/travel/national-
park-service-drone-ban/ [https://perma.cc/DGH6-J663]. 
 165. See 54 U.S.C. §	100101(a) (2014) (stating that the purpose of the NPS is to 
“conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life” at national park sites 
“and to provide for the enjoyment” of those sites). 
 166. See No Drone Zone, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/no_drone
_zone/dc [https://perma.cc/S22U-DF6B] (last modified June 14, 2016, 2:02:57 PM) 
(providing more information on the FAA’s No Drone Zone designation affecting the D.C. 
area). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016) 
168 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
restrictions, it would seem sensible to enforce them under federal law, 
as is already sometimes done.167 Geofences could eventually be useful 
tools for helping to enforce these sorts of restrictions as well. 
B. Drone Laws Most Suitable for State Governments 
In contrast, several other drone regulatory tasks are arguably 
better suited for lower levels of government. The following Section 
discusses those tasks that could seemingly be addressed most 
effectively through state regulation. 
1.  Privacy and Safety Rules to Protect Landowners 
State governments are arguably in a better position than the 
FAA to craft laws aimed at protecting citizens on the ground from 
many of the safety and privacy risks associated with civilian drones. 
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reserves a 
substantial amount of regulatory authority to state governments.168 
States routinely exercise this authority—commonly known as the 
“police power”—to enact laws in a wide range of areas aimed at 
promoting the general health, safety, and welfare of their citizenry.169 
Such state laws often sit atop federal regulatory floors, helping to 
govern activities ranging from automobile driving170 to hunting171 and 
lighting fireworks.172 
Much of the recent flurry of state drone legislation throughout 
the country is classifiable as police power regulation. For instance, 
 
 167. For example, the FAA already limits drone flying near “military operation areas.” 
See Airspace Restrictions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly
/airspace_restrictions/ [https://perma.cc/5C3G-EP84] (last modified July 14, 2016, 11:49:58 
AM). 
 168. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”). 
 169. See Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “police 
power” as “[a] state’s Tenth Amendment right	.	.	.	to establish and enforce laws protecting 
the public’s health, safety, and general welfare, or to delegate this right to local 
governments”). 
 170. See generally Highway Safety Laws by State, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY 
ASS’N, http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/bystate/ [https://perma.cc/6DB4-NUBX] (providing 
a user-friendly summary of automobile traffic laws by state). 
 171. See generally Where to Hunt: Hunting Info for Every State, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS 
FOUND., www.wheretohunt.org [https://perma.cc/ND9J-DU7Q] (providing convenient access 
to state hunting laws and regulations). 
 172. See generally Directory of State Laws, AM. PYROTECHNICS ASS’N, http://www
.americanpyro.com/state-law-directory [https://perma.cc/N3DN-RTGP] (providing a detailed 
listing of fireworks restrictions by state).  
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statutes recently enacted in Florida,173 Idaho,174 and North Carolina175 
create civil causes of action against citizens and state agencies who 
use drones to conduct intentional surveillance of individuals or 
property, and Texas classifies recording surveillance of a person or 
real property without permission, including recordings from drones, 
as a misdemeanor.176 Drone statutes enacted in other states restrict 
the use of drones for certain purposes, such as hunting or interfering 
with legal hunting.177 These new state statutes represent the 
beginnings of what could ultimately become a full body of state-level 
drone safety and privacy laws. They are evidence that state 
legislatures are already engaged in valuable policy experimentation 
for this new and growing industry. Fortunately, the FAA appears to 
have recently acknowledged that many such laws fall within a state’s 
police power authority;178 it now seems undisputed that states enjoy at 
least some discretion to tailor these sorts of drone laws to fit the 
needs and preferences of their own jurisdictions.179 
 
 173. See FLA. STAT. §	934.50(3) (2015) (prohibiting law enforcement agencies from 
using a drone “to gather evidence or other information”). 
 174. See IDAHO CODE §	21-213(2) (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting a 
“person, entity or state agency” from using “an unmanned aircraft system to intentionally 
conduct surveillance of, gather evidence or collect information” about an individual, an 
individual’s curtilage, or an agricultural industry, without written consent). 
 175. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-300.1 (2015) (prohibiting a “person, entity, or State 
agency” from conducting surveillance of a person or private real property without the 
person’s consent, with exceptions for newsgathering and certain instances for law 
enforcement). 
 176. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §	423.003 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of 
84th Legis.). See generally id. §	423.002 (providing exceptions to restrictions on drone-
assisted photography and filming for such activities as “professional or scholarly research,” 
military exercises, and natural gas or electric utility operations). 
 177. See IDAHO CODE §	36-1101(b) (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting 
hunting with an “unmanned aircraft system” or using an unmanned aircraft to “molest, stir 
up, rally or drive in any manner any of the game animals or game birds of this state”); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §	324.40112(2)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 
98th Legis.) (prohibiting the use of unmanned vehicles “to affect animal or fish behavior in 
order to hinder or prevent the lawful taking of an animal or a fish”); id. §	324.40111(5) 
(prohibiting the use of unmanned vehicles to “take game or fish”); N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-
401.24 (2015) (prohibiting hunting or fishing with a drone). See generally Current 
Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES. (Aug. 
16, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-
landscape.aspx [https://perma.cc/JPC5-GS5V] (describing hunting-related state drone laws). 
 178. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 3 (listing examples of police power 
laws that are not subject to federal preemption, including warrant requirements for drone-
assisted police surveillance, prohibitions on drone voyeurism, prohibitions on drone-
assisted fishing or hunting, and prohibitions on the attachment of firearms or weapons to 
drones). 
 179. This is not to ignore that Congress has granted the FAA the power to ensure the 
“safety of aircraft” in “navigable airspace.” 49 U.S.C. §	40103(b) (2012). 
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2.  Clarifications of Landowners’ Airspace Rights 
State governments are also best positioned to clarify certain 
questions of state property law that have grown increasingly relevant 
with the recent proliferation of drone technologies. Chief among 
these are questions regarding the extent to which landowners are 
entitled to exclude drones from flying at low altitudes directly over 
their parcels. Should landowners be legally entitled to exclude 
unwanted objects from hovering a mere two feet above their 
backyards? What if an object hovers at twenty feet? What if it hovers 
at 200 feet? Away from airports and below altitudes where airplanes 
routinely fly, these questions about the scope of landowners’ rights in 
low-altitude airspace have very little to do with regulating interstate 
commerce, establishing nationwide uniformity, or protecting manned 
aviation; they are primarily issues of state property law.180 
Property law has long recognized that owners of real property 
hold more than mere rights in the surface of a parcel; they have 
interests in at least some of the airspace immediately above the 
surface as well.181 State condominium laws further reinforce this 
doctrine, governing landowners’ rights to convey interests in specific 
portions of their airspace to others by deed.182 However, laws in most 
states offer relatively little guidance regarding the extent of 
landowners’ rights to exclude unwanted objects such as drones from 
the low-altitude airspace directly above their land.183 The common 
law rules applicable to this issue in most states rely upon vague, 
nuisance-like balancing tests to address conflicts between flying 
objects and landowners.184 These fuzzy rules may have adequately 
governed such conflicts prior to the civilian drone era, but they are 
becoming increasingly inadequate as the incidence of conflicts 
between landowner and drone operators grows.185 
 
 180. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (stating that “[p]roperty 
interests are created and defined by state law”). 
 181. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 182. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §	38-33-102 (LEXIS through 2016 Legis. Sess.) 
(recognizing the ownership of condominiums “to consist of a separate estate in an 
individual air space unit of a multi-unit property together with an undivided interest in 
common elements”). See generally Donna S. Bennett, Condominium Homeownership in 
the United States: A Selected Annotated Bibliography of Legal Sources, 103 L. LIBR. J. 249 
(2011) (providing a useful primer on condominium law). 
 183. See Rule, supra note 143, at 182–86 (discussing variations in property law for low-
altitude airspace). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. at 169–74 (describing how drone technologies are raising questions in such 
areas as aerial trespass, takings, and Fourth Amendment limitations on law enforcement 
searches). 
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Large corporations such as Amazon186 and Alphabet187 that are 
interested in offering drone-assisted delivery services in the United 
States would benefit greatly if the FAA were to eliminate rather than 
clarify landowners’ rights to exclude in low-altitude space. They could 
likewise benefit if federal laws broadly preempted municipal 
authority to regulate drone activities in that space, allowing 
companies with federal drone use authorizations to ignore most state 
and local drone use restrictions. Expanding drone delivery 
throughout the country could be less complicated and expensive for 
these companies if the FAA were to establish sole control over low-
altitude airspace and leave minimal room for aerial trespass claims or 
state or local drone use restrictions.188 However, such a sweeping, 
unsubstantiated, federal “unitary choice preemption” approach to 
landowner airspace rights laws would also arguably orchestrate one of 
the largest uncompensated transfers of property interests in United 
States history.189 Millions of Americans would lose valuable rights to 
prevent unwanted devices from physically invading the airspace just 
above their backyards and rooftops, receiving almost nothing in 
return. 
Ironically, prevailing property theory principles suggest that the 
growing conflicts between drone operators and landowners over the 
use of low-altitude airspace call for an opposite policy response: that 
of strengthening and clarifying landowners’ property interests in that 
space.190 State statutes that better defined landowners’ respective 
 
 186. See Jacob Pramuk, Drone Battle’s Next Front: Your Local Government, CNBC 
(Dec. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/23/drone-battles-next-front-your-
local-government.html [https://perma.cc/CL7T-XY5W] (reporting that Amazon declared 
that “states and localities must not be allowed to regulate small drones that the FAA has 
authorized”). 
 187. See Hope King, Google X Hopes to Launch Drone Deliveries by 2017, CNN (Nov. 
2, 2015, 4:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/02/technology/google-drone-delivery/ 
[https://perma.cc/U5KR-RQUR] (describing “Project Wing,” a project of Alphabet’s tech 
lab Google X, that is developing technologies for drone-assisted product deliveries). 
 188. See Cecilia Kang, Localities Object as F.A.A. Asserts Drone Authority, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2015, at B1 (stating that tech companies would benefit from “[a]ny 
rollback	.	.	.	of local drone regulations” and reporting that “[c]ompanies such as Amazon 
and Google have hired dozens of lobbyists over the last year to visit aviation committees 
on Capitol Hill” and that these “companies want a light touch by regulators to help give 
their drone efforts the widest possible latitude”). 
 189. See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text (explaining difficulties surrounding 
“federal unitary choice preemption”); see also infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 190. A handful of states have enacted statutes that seemingly affirm landowners’ 
substantial airspace rights. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §	659 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.) (“Land	.	.	.	includes free or occupied space for an indefinite distance 
upwards	.	.	.	subject to limitations upon the use or airspace imposed, and rights in the use 
of airspace granted, by law.”); GA. CODE ANN. §	51-9-9 (2015) (“The owner of realty has 
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entitlements in low-altitude airspace and established that those 
entitlements ran with the land would make it easier for parties to 
negotiate drone-related covenants and easements involving that 
space.191 Communities could more easily incorporate private drone 
use rules into their covenants, conditions, and restrictions.192 
Municipal governments would operate under greater legal certainty 
when purchasing or condemning airspace easements for “drone 
corridors” above private land. And such statutes could potentially 
even help to simplify certain criminal law and takings law questions 
arising from the use of drone technologies.193 
Several state legislatures have already enacted laws providing 
that landowners have at least some rights to exclude drones from the 
airspace directly above their parcels. An Oregon statute enables 
landowners to recover treble damages for injuries caused when 
private citizens fly unwelcome drones less than 400 feet above their 
land.194 Additionally, a Nevada statute creates civil liability for drone 
operators who fly less than 250 feet above private property after the 
underlying landowner objects.195 Clear signals from the FAA that it 
intends to embrace a regulatory floor approach and not seek to 
preempt such state laws would go far in encouraging other states to 
enact similar legislation. 
 
title downwards and upwards indefinitely; and an unlawful interference with his rights, 
either below or above the surface, gives him a right of action.”); MINN. STAT. §	360.012.2 
(LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“The ownership of the space above the lands	.	.	.	of this 
state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the 
right of flight	.	.	.	.”). See Rule, supra note 143, at 179–86 (providing a recent analysis on 
this topic). 
 191. For a full description of the Coasean concept that clearly exhibited how land-
related entitlements can facilitate more efficient bargaining, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 112 (1985) (“Not only must initial entitlements be 
assigned, but rules by which the entitlements are legally protected must also be 
established.”). 
 192. Private covenants that regulate the exterior colors of buildings, the placement of 
TV antennas, roof-mounted air conditioning units, and other conspicuous items serve 
similar functions. See generally David L. Callies, Common Interest Communities: An 
Introduction, 37 URB. LAW. 325 (2005) (describing the use of private covenants in 
residential settings). 
 193. See Rule, supra note 143, at 171–74 (describing takings law and Fourth 
Amendment questions arising from drones, and discussing how uncertainty regarding 
landowners’ rights to exclude drones from airspace above their parcels is complicating 
those questions). 
 194. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	837.380 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
 195. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §	493.103 (West, Westlaw through 78th Reg. Sess. & 29th 
Spec. Sess. of 2015). 
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3.  State Registration and Operator Licensing Programs 
One other regulatory task that arguably suits state governments 
well is that of assisting the FAA in administering registration and 
licensing programs for civilian drones and drone operators. In 
December of 2015, the FAA introduced its first-ever federal 
registration requirements for noncommercial drones weighing less 
than fifty-five pounds.196 Unfortunately, these new requirements 
involve little more than paying five dollars, providing some basic 
contact information, clicking through some disclosures, and affixing a 
unique serial number to each registered drone device.197 No 
knowledge test or live interaction with a government official is 
required.198 Already, these new registration rules have been criticized 
as being potentially unenforceable199 and as doing too little to address 
the safety and privacy risks associated with civilian drones.200 
Fortunately, state governments throughout the nation have 
motor vehicles divisions and offices that already handle a large 
volume of registrants each year.201 These offices help to ensure that 
automobiles registered within a given state meet state and federal 
 
 196. See Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 
Fed. Reg. 78,593, 78,593–648 (Dec. 16, 2015) (to be codified in scattered parts of 14 
C.F.R.). 
 197. See id. at 78,645–48. See generally Welcome to the Small Unmanned Aircraft 
System (sUAS) Registration Service, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://registermyuas.faa
.gov/ [https://perma.cc/YXN5-3EXP] (providing more information about the registration 
process). 
 198. See Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 
Fed. Reg. at 78,645–48. 
 199. See, e.g., Seung Lee, Is the FAA’s Drone Registration Program Legal?, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 23, 2015, 4:10 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/faas-drone-registration-
program-legal-408701?piano_t=1 [https://perma.cc/VSX3-WKRQ] (describing a Florida 
attorney’s legal challenge to the validity of the new FAA registration requirements for 
small civilian drones). 
 200. See, e.g., Editorial Board, Opinion, The Government’s Plan to Register Drones 
Doesn’t Go Far Enough, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/the-governments-plan-to-register-recreational-drones-doesnt-go-far-enough
/2015/10/26/bd21aac8-79c5-11e5-a958-d889faf561dc_story.html [https://perma.cc/DE9Y-
YTVV] (arguing that the FAA’s drone registration rules are “not nearly enough” to 
address issues associated with the nation’s rapidly rising volume of civilian drone 
activities). 
 201. See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Table 1-16: Retail(a) New Passenger Car Sales 
(Thousands of Units), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot
.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_16.html [https://
perma.cc/4LXR-XG26] (last updated Oct. 2015) (reporting that approximately 7,585,000 
new passenger cars were purchased in the United States in 2013, the vast majority of which 
would presumably need to be registered in state agency offices). 
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safety and performance requirements and are registered and plated.202 
Such offices could also serve as convenient places for citizens and 
businesses to register drones or to renew drone registrations based on 
periodic drone safety and performance inspections. The sheer volume 
of new drone sales in the United States is already far more 
comparable to that of new automobile sales than to that of new 
manned airplane or helicopter sales.203 Accordingly, a cooperative, 
federalism-based approach to drone registration that utilizes the 
FAA’s expertise and leverages existing state resources might be 
policymakers’ best chance at affordably implementing a truly robust, 
meaningful drone registration program.204 
For the hundreds of thousands of drones manufactured and sold 
before safety and performance requirements for registration go into 
effect, states and the FAA could create a Class B registration option 
that allows some limited use of these noncompliant devices. Such a 
tiered regulatory system, which has analogs in land use zoning205 and 
automobile registration realms,206 might help to appease owners of 
preexisting nonconforming drones without unduly sacrificing the 
safety of manned aircraft and of individuals on the ground. 
State governments might also be well-positioned to assist with 
the licensing of drone operators. The FAA’s proposed federal drone 
 
 202. See generally Residency Requirement for First Time California Driver License and 
Identification Card Applicants, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www
.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv [https://perma.cc/4MS9-NCZ6] (providing information about the 
types of valuable functions that motor vehicles division offices typically perform). 
 203. See Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Table 1-12: U.S. Sales or Deliveries of New Aircraft, 
Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.rita.dot.gov
/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01
_12.html [https://perma.cc/E7WS-TVZK] (last updated Apr. 2016) (reporting that less 
than 3,000 new aviation aircrafts are delivered for sale in the United States in a typical 
year). But see Michal Addady, The Number of Drones Expected to Sell During the 
Holidays Is Scaring the Government, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://fortune.com
/2015/09/29/drones-holiday-sales/ [https://perma.cc/YN23-GBQ9] (reporting that United 
States retailers were expected to sell more than one million small drones in the 2015 
holiday season alone). 
 204. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 243, 283–85 (2005) (providing a basic overview of “cooperative 
federalism”). 
 205. See generally Deepa Varadarajan, Billboards and Big Utilities: Borrowing Land-
Use Concepts to Regulate “Nonconforming” Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 112 YALE 
L.J. 2553, 2566–68 (2003) (discussing the treatment of preexisting nonconforming land 
uses under zoning law and legal and policy rationales for such treatment). 
 206. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §	25 (McKinney, Westlaw through July 2016) 
(describing distinct, more restrictive rules for “limited use vehicles” in New York that do 
not meet conventional automobile registration requirements). 
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operator licensing system for commercial drone fliers could easily 
become overwhelmed if the industry continues to rapidly expand. 
Consider, for instance, the “knowledge test” requirement for 
commercial drone operators, loosely described in the FAA’s notice of 
proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) that was released in February of 
2015.207 How does the FAA plan to administer these tests and 
facilitate the licensing of the potentially tens of thousands of drone 
operators per year who may soon be seeking them?208 The agency’s 
proposed procedures, which are significantly less onerous than 
conventional pilot licensing procedures, are arguably more akin to 
automobile driver licenses than to conventional FAA pilot licenses.209 
Given these strong similarities, why not explore the possibility of 
using state government resources to help administer these licensing 
programs? 
Most state governments already have well-established licensing 
procedures for automobile drivers.210 These often include driving tests 
and written or computer-assisted applicant exams designed to ensure 
that licensed individuals are adequately educated about traffic laws 
and trained to drive competently and safely.211 One can easily imagine 
comparable licensing procedures administered through state motor 
vehicle division offices that use many of the same government 
resources presently used for driver license certification and testing. 
 
 207. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. FAA-2015-0150, Notice No. 15-
01, Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems 107–10 (Feb. 15, 
2015), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/recently_published/media/2120
-AJ60_NPRM_2-15-2015_joint_signature.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PTT-JQ2L].  
 208. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP 
Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 143 (2015) (discussing the issue of drone operator licensing in 
detail). 
 209. See, e.g., Kelsey D. Atherton, The Future of Urban Planning: Zoning for Drones, 
POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/future-urban-
planning-zoning-drones [https://perma.cc/EQ3B-A3QJ] (drawing similar parallels between 
drone flying and automobile driving by quoting urban designer Mitchell Sipus as stating 
that drone flying is “not really that different than regular automobile traffic”). 
 210. See, e.g., Requirements for a California Driver License (FFDL5), STATE OF CAL. 
DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES (June 2016), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/?1dmy
&urile=wcm:path:/dmv_content_en/dmv/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffdl05 [https://perma.cc
/M886-74T9] (providing California’s requirements for obtaining a driver license). 
 211. See, e.g., DMV’s Driving Test (FFDL 22), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES (May 2012), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts
/ffdl22 [https://perma.cc/QUD5-HAWY] (describing California’s physical driving test 
requirement); see also Samples of Driver License Knowledge Tests, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T 
OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/interactive/tdrive
/exam [https://perma.cc/92LS-342Y] (providing information regarding California’s written 
driver license test requirement covering state traffic laws). 
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North Carolina has already enacted a statute establishing a state-level 
commercial drone operator licensing program.212 Among other things, 
North Carolina’s statute requires that commercial drone operators be 
at least sixteen years of age, have a valid driver’s license, and pass a 
drone flying knowledge test to obtain an operator license.213 
Operating a drone for commercial purposes in North Carolina 
without this license is a Class 1 misdemeanor.214 As North Carolina’s 
statute shows, there is no compelling reason for such requirements to 
be implemented and enforced solely at the federal level.215 
C. The Need for Municipal Government Involvement 
Although federal and state governments are well equipped to 
handle much of the nation’s drone regulation, some drone regulatory 
tasks are so inherently local in nature that local governments are 
better suited to manage them. Municipalities, holding land use 
regulatory authority under state zoning enabling acts,216 are arguably 
authorized under those same statutes to regulate activities in the 
airspace just above the ground as well. The subsections below 
describe why involving local governments in drone regulation could 
allow for a degree of precision and efficiency that are otherwise 
unattainable. 
1.  Access to Firsthand, Local Information 
Municipalities’ access to firsthand information about the unique 
preferences and attributes of their communities makes them essential 
contributors to any comprehensive drone regulatory system. 
Consider, for example, a simple policy decision of whether and under 
what conditions to permit civilian drone activity in the low-altitude 
airspace above a particular city neighborhood. If the neighborhood is 
 
 212. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	63-96 (2015) (requiring permits for the commercial 
operation of an unmanned aircraft system). 
 213. See Act of July 1, 2016, ch. 90, sec. 14.5(b), §	63-96(b), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws __, __ 
(to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	63-96(b)). 
 214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	63-96(e). 
 215. See Christopher Simmons, The Drone Act of 2016: Calif. Assemblyman Mike 
Gatto Announces Consumer Aviation Measure, CAL. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://
californianewswire.com/the-drone-act-of-2016-calif-assemblyman-mike-gatto-announces-
consumer-aviation-measure/ [https://perma.cc/D35J-5JH8] (announcing the California State 
Legislature’s consideration of its own bill that would require drone owners to have 
insurance policies and tiny electronic license plates for their devices). 
 216. See FISCHEL, supra note 192, at 22 (“Zoning is one of the community’s ‘police 
powers[,]’	” and “[t]his broad regulatory authority is derived by the municipality from the 
state government. In most cases a special enabling act, patterned after a standard act 
promulgated in the 1920s, gives the locality the power to zone.”). 
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situated near an airport or important security site, then federal 
agencies should obviously have authority to restrict or prohibit 
nearby drone use. Beyond that, however, municipalities are better 
equipped than federal agencies to gather and process the information 
relevant to determining where and when drones should be permitted 
to fly. Is the neighborhood filled with single-family homes, secluded 
private patios, and backyard pools? Or is it merely a collection of old 
warehouses in an industrially zoned area of town? Unlike the FAA, 
the nation’s thousands of local governments have this sort of 
information at their fingertips and use it on a regular basis to make 
land use regulatory decisions and to otherwise tailor policies to fit the 
needs of their own communities. 
2.  Longtime Regulation of Other Airspace Uses 
The long history of municipalities regulating other activities in 
low-altitude airspace is yet another compelling reason to involve them 
in the nation’s regulatory structure for drones.217 Many new small 
civilian drones are programmed to hover primarily in the layer of 
airspace that rests just above a community’s buildings, trees, and 
other grounded structures;218 building setbacks, height restrictions, 
and other common municipal ordinance provisions already regulate 
uses of that same space.219 
Building height restrictions and setbacks benefit landowners, in 
part, by giving them greater long-term certainty regarding the scope 
and degree of their seclusion from neighbors. For example, suppose 
that a landowner who is installing a backyard pool purposefully 
situates the pool area on the lot and designs it such that neighbors in 
nearby homes cannot peer through their windows and watch the 
homeowner’s family swim. Local setbacks and height restrictions can 
 
 217. See, e.g., County of San Diego, Cal., Ordinance §	4600 (May 2016), http://www
.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/pds/zoning/z4000.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q8E-W8Y4]. 
 218. A growing number of drone manufacturers are embedding software into new 
drones with preprogrammed maximum altitude limits of 400 feet. See, e.g., Lance Ulanoff, 
Yuneec Typhoon H Drone Is Full of Awesome Power and Frustrating Complexity, 
MASHABLE (July 7, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/07/07/yuneec-typhoon-h-drone-
review/#oGGkrz8Ab5q9 [https://perma.cc/GY5W-LYL4] (noting that one new drone’s 
“angle mode” is the least restrictive and allows it to “go to its max 400-foot altitude”); 
Phantom 3 Professional- Flight Limits and No-Fly Zones, DJI, http://wiki.dji.com/en/index
.php/Phantom_3_Professional-_Flight_Limits_and_No-Fly_Zones [https://perma.cc/ZZ6V
-2WG7] (last modified Dec. 3, 2015 9:28 PM) (noting that the DJI’s Phantom 3 drone is 
pre-programmed to have a maximum height limit of 400 feet). 
 219. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 284–85 
(2011) (describing how building setbacks and height restriction ordinances limit the use of 
low-altitude airspace). 
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make it much more difficult for neighbors to renovate nearby homes 
in ways that threaten the privacy-protecting elements of this 
homeowner’s pool design. From an academic perspective, these sorts 
of land use restrictions effectively designate the low-altitude airspace 
near the homes involved as a “conservation commons,”220 enabling 
the space to serve as a valuable seclusion buffer that reciprocally 
benefits residents below.221 
By keeping eyes, ears, and noises out of low airspace, height 
restrictions, setbacks, and similar regulations help to protect citizens’ 
investments in pool walls, privacy hedges, privacy fences, and other 
types of seclusion-driven land development designs. However, as 
drone activity—a “rival” use of the same low-altitude space—
becomes more commonplace, it increasingly interferes with 
landowners’ longtime use of the space as a seclusion buffer.222 With 
the increasing affordability of drones, the cost-related barriers that 
have enabled low-altitude airspace to serve this valuable seclusion 
function for decades are quickly evaporating. Low-cost, camera-
mounted drones—readily available at big box stores throughout the 
country—are now enabling ordinary citizens to gain access to visual 
vantage points into backyards and other private land areas that were 
previously attainable only aboard helicopters or manned airplanes 
with FAA-licensed pilots. In much of the country, this emerging 
threat to privacy surely exceeds any threats the devices might pose to 
manned air flight.223 And local government officials seem better 
positioned than the FAA to determine which of these two competing 
airspace uses—drone activity or preservation of seclusion—to 
prioritize in each specific neighborhood. 
 
 220. See id. at 296–97 (characterizing height-restricted airspace as a “conservation 
commons”); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and 
Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39 (2003) (describing conservation commons as 
“commons whose most efficient use is nonuse”). 
 221. See Rule, supra note 221, at 285 (describing bulk and height restrictions as 
“reciprocal in that they require nearly all neighboring landowners to give up those same 
rights and nearly all landowners get the same general benefit from the restrictions” and 
suggesting that because of this reciprocal nature, such restrictions “generally respect 
existing airspace rights”). 
 222. See id. at 294–95 (distinguishing between “rival” and “nonrival” airspace uses and 
detailing the economic analysis of low-altitude airspace). 
 223. See, e.g., Mike Nolan, As Popularity of Drones Takes off, More Limits on Where 
They Can Fly, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2016, 3:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs
/daily-southtown/news/ct-sta-drone-restrictions-st-0122-20160125-story.html [https://perma
.cc/8QMP-TPCY] (quoting Tim McCarthy, the police chief of Orland Park, Illinois, as 
stating that the city’s “No. 1 concern was privacy” in enacting a drone use restriction 
ordinance, and that “[p]eople don’t want to have a camera looking at them on their 
property”). 
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3.  Unique Capacity to Craft Location-Specific Rules 
One other argument supporting greater municipal involvement 
in drone regulation is that recent advancements in drone technologies 
necessitate a location-sensitive regulatory approach that only 
localities are equipped to effectively establish and enforce. Courts 
and policymakers relied upon similar sorts of arguments to justify the 
emergence of municipal land use controls—and, ultimately, zoning 
laws—nearly a century ago. 
In the late nineteenth century, most municipal governments in 
the United States did relatively little to regulate land use within their 
communities. During that era, common law nuisance claims and 
private covenants were the primary means of balancing competing 
land uses among neighbors.224 Most of the nation’s predominantly 
rural and low-density communities had no pressing need for more 
regulation than that.225 However, advancements in building 
techniques and other technological and social changes occurring 
shortly thereafter sparked a period of rapid urbanization.226 Many 
cities quickly grew larger and more crowded, generating an 
unprecedented volume and degree of conflicts among neighbors.227 
Rather than relying on the federal government to address these 
new challenges, municipalities began implementing their own policies 
aimed at promoting safer and more efficient land use.228 For example, 
in an effort to mitigate urban fire risks, the city of Boston adopted an 
ordinance in 1906 that imposed varying building height restrictions 
depending on whether land was in a predominantly commercial or 
residential area.229 Other cities in the late nineteenth century began 
adopting ordinances to prohibit potentially disruptive land uses from 
certain predominantly residential areas; many of these local 
ordinances seemed largely reactionary in nature.230 For example, 
complaints about the smells of slaughterhouses prompted ordinances 
 
 224. RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, §	1:1 (detailing the history of land use disputes 
and nuisance litigation). 
 225. See id. 
 226. See id. §	1:2. 
 227. See Rule, supra note 219, at 284–85 (detailing how urbanization and 
advancements in high-rise building construction fueled landowner conflicts). 
 228. See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 112 (1977) (stating 
that the “introduction of zoning in 1916 and its subsequent spread are typically explained 
as constituting the establishment of public control over use of private property that was 
made necessary by the increasing complexity, congestion, and density of modern urban 
life”); RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, §	1:1.  
 229. See MICHAEL HOLLERAN, BOSTON’S “CHANGEFUL TIMES” 166–73 (1998) 
(providing a detailed history of Boston’s building height restrictions). 
 230. See RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, §	1:1. 
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limiting their locations.231 Residential landowners’ complaints about 
nearby taverns and fears of one opening next door surely contributed 
to the growing number of restrictions on where taverns could be sited, 
as well.232 
As urbanization continued into the early twentieth century, 
ordinances that targeted certain types of land uses and particular 
areas of town eventually became insufficient to adequately address 
growing tensions among neighboring urban land uses in some cities.233 
At that historic breaking point, zoning ordinances began to quickly 
spread across the nation.234 Municipalities throughout the country 
increasingly adopted zoning laws to help preserve the precious 
tranquility of residential neighborhoods in modern times.235 To quote 
Justice Sutherland’s words in the famous 1926 zoning case, Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.:236 
Building zone laws are of modern origin	.	.	.	. Until recent 
years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great 
increase and concentration of population, problems have 
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and 
will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the 
use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. 
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which	.	.	.	are 
so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century 
ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been 
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are 
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons 
analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, 
before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street 
railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and 
unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while 
the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope 
of their application must expand or contract to meet the new 
and different conditions	.	.	.	.237 
An analogous situation arguably exists today, as drone 
technologies increasingly engender conflicts that ordinary trespass or 
 
 231. See id. 
 232. See id. (providing historical background on the tensions and problems that 
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nuisance claims and broad federal regulations are ill-equipped to 
govern. Even state aerial trespass laws or other airspace rights 
statutes can only offer limited privacy protection for landowners in 
many settings.238 Particularly in urban areas where parcel sizes tend to 
be relatively small, a drone hovering 100 feet above an adjacent 
parcel can get nearly as much visual access into a secluded yard next 
door as a drone that flies directly above the secluded area. Nuisance 
claims do not require any sort of physical intrusion into the space of 
another and thus might theoretically provide a basis for liability in 
some situations.239 However, just as nuisance law and other general 
state law provisions ultimately proved inadequate on their own to 
govern land use conflicts in the early twentieth century, such laws will 
ultimately prove insufficient to govern drone use conflicts among 
neighbors. 
Early twentieth century policymakers turned to municipal zoning 
to more effectively manage the growing volume of land use conflicts 
arising in that period, and drone zoning could serve a similar function 
as drones increasingly compete for the use of low-altitude airspace in 
the coming years. Already, several cities have crafted ordinances 
aimed at protecting the serenity of residential neighborhoods from 
powerful drone technologies.240 The city of Evanston, Illinois, 
imposed a two-year moratorium on drones in 2013.241 In the same 
year, Iowa City, Iowa, adopted an ordinance by popular petition that 
prohibited the use of drones for the enforcement of qualified traffic 
law violations.242 A few months later, the small town of St. 
 
 238. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
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Bonafacius, Minnesota, enacted an indefinite ban on civilian 
drones.243 More recently, the Board of Commissioners of Long Beach 
Township, New Jersey, adopted an ordinance providing that 
unauthorized operators of drones within township limits could face up 
to ninety days of jail time or fines of up to $2,000.244 Multiple other 
local governments have also recently adopted or considered drone 
use restrictions, and additional ordinances are sure to come.245 Much 
like the early twentieth century location restrictions on 
slaughterhouses and taverns that served as precursors to modern 
zoning, many of these proposed or adopted ordinances only restrict 
drone flying in certain localized areas such as residential 
neighborhoods.246 
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bonifacius.mn.us/drones.pdf [https://perma.cc/D65J-4KSH]; see also Tom Meersman, St. 
Bonifacius Says No to Drones, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2013, 12:07 AM), http://www
.startribune.com/st-bonifacius-says-no-to-drones/201723501/ [https://perma.cc/PU6H-JVWF]. 
 244. TOWNSHIP OF LONG BEACH, N.J., CODE §§	1-17, 57-2 to -4 (2015), http://
ecode360.com/30512985 [https://perma.cc/NTM4-FZ5E]; see also Erik Larsen, Long Beach 
Township Bans Drones, ASBURY PARK PRESS (May 26, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.app
.com/story/news/local/ocean-county/2015/05/22/long-beach-township-bans-drones/27817439/ 
[https://perma.cc/E8PD-DJJN].  
 245. See, e.g., PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., MUN. CODE §§	10-12-1 to -4 (2015), http://www
.ci.paradise-valley.az.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/101 [https://perma.cc/UD3X-7HV4] 
(detailing prohibitions against drone flying above others’ land without express permission 
and against drone flying above public property without a special permit, and listing 
requirements for city-level registration of commercial drones); see also John Best, Forks 
Township Supervisors Discuss Possibility of Drone Laws, LEHIGHVALLEYLIVE (June 8, 
2015, 12:52 PM), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/easton/index.ssf/2015/06/forks_township
_supervisors_dis.html [https://perma.cc/2RUW-3LNX]; Molly Eadie, Public Safety 
Committee Tables Ordinance Regulating Drone Use, TROY REC. POL. (Feb. 19, 2015, 9:34 
PM), http://www.troyrecord.com/government-and-politics/20150219/public-safety-committee-
tables-ordinance-regulating-drone-use [https://perma.cc/M4KH-2SND] (describing possible 
changes to a proposed ordinance in Troy, New York, that would allow for either a $250 
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In other countries, drone restrictions are similarly growing more 
location-specific. For example, the Japanese government enacted a 
law in 2016 prohibiting unauthorized civilian drone flights over 
government buildings and certain other areas.247 The United Arab 
Emirates has enacted similar rules.248 These location-based 
restrictions likewise resemble the early land use ordinances that 
served as precursors to modern zoning laws in the early twentieth 
century.249 
Given these historical similarities, it is not surprising that at least 
a couple of commentators have already begun to imagine the 
possibilities of using horizontal zoning ordinances to help regulate 
civilian drone use.250 The legal rules applicable to drone uses under 
these ordinances would vary depending on the specific “zone” of land 
over which the drone would fly. Such drone zoning laws could utilize 
existing land use zoning maps, basing drone use rules on whether a 
drone is flying above a residential, commercial, industrial, or other 
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land use zone. Alternatively, municipalities could create overlay 
zoning maps that sit atop land use zoning maps and apply solely to 
drone flying activity.251 Because drone activities could increasingly 
impact land use permitting decisions and comprehensive land use 
planning, municipalities could benefit from having the ability to craft 
drone zoning laws for their own jurisdictions.252 
IV.  DESIGNING AN EFFICIENT DRONE ZONING LAW 
Where should cities begin in their attempts to craft drone zoning 
ordinances? Unfortunately, municipal officials tasked with creating 
these ordinances are likely to soon discover that they have few 
templates or examples from which to commence the drafting process. 
The sort of horizontal drone zoning ordinance contemplated in this 
Article is largely unprecedented, and few policymakers or scholars 
have written about such an approach.253 
Because drone zoning is a strategy borne out of conventional 
land use zoning policies, the existing body of land use zoning laws is a 
valuable starting point for designing any drone zoning ordinance. 
Land use zoning seeks to keep loud factories away from doctors’ 
offices and to prevent nightclubs from popping up in residential 
neighborhoods. Rather than waiting to address conflicts after they 
arise, conventional zoning ordinances regulate land uses ex ante and 
thereby prevent many conflicts from ever occurring.254 Of course, land 
use zoning is not without its critics—it can contribute to 
socioeconomic and racial segregation, isolation, sprawl, and other 
problems.255 However, the widespread adoption of zoning laws 
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throughout the country and the continued use of such laws are 
evidence of their great value to modern society. Several elements of 
this established body of law could eventually prove useful in the 
drone zoning context as well. 
To be clear, the vision of drone zoning described in this Article is 
substantially different from the supposed drone “zoning” model that 
Amazon Prime Air unveiled in July 2015.256 Amazon’s vision of drone 
zoning necessarily assumed broad federal power, enabling the 
company to freely fly drones over the vast majority of the nation’s 
land, regardless of the wishes of landowners or of state or local 
authorities. Under Amazon’s proposal, the FAA would divide nearly 
all of the nation’s low-altitude airspace vertically rather than 
horizontally.257 Specifically, the agency would designate space 
between 400 and 500 feet above the ground as a drone no-fly zone, 
reserve space between 200 and 400 feet for “high-speed transit” of 
drones, and leave space below 200 feet for “low-speed, localized 
transit.”258 Amazon’s plan provided for no horizontal zoning of drone 
uses except to designate certain predefined low-risk areas where 
hobbyist drones with fewer safety features could freely fly.259 
In contrast, the drone zoning policies envisioned in this Article 
would allow drone use rules to vary from neighborhood to 
neighborhood, much as land use restrictions in commercially zoned or 
industrially zoned areas differ from those in single family residential 
areas. For the reasons described above, such variation and tailoring of 
drone use restrictions by location could promote more optimal uses of 
the nation’s scarce low-altitude airspace as drone activity increases in 
the United States.260 Drone zoning ordinances could eventually 
become a key means of accommodating valuable drone uses in a city 
without unduly sacrificing other important uses of the airspace 
involved. The following subsections describe how the same simple 
economics principles that help to shape land use zoning ordinances 
could eventually serve a similar function in the development of 
municipal drone zoning laws. 
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A. Weighing Costs and Benefits 
Basic microeconomic theory provides a useful general 
framework for designating drone zones and crafting drone restrictions 
applicable to each type of zone. In essence, drone use should be 
legally permissible only when and where its net social benefits are 
greater than zero. In other words, if the aggregate benefits to society 
of allowing a particular type of drone to fly in a particular location 
and at a particular time exceed the aggregate social costs of that 
drone flight, then the activity should be allowable under the law.261 If 
not, then laws should generally prohibit the drone activity. 
Concededly, recitations of this sort of simple cost-benefit 
analysis, in the abstract, almost always obscure the complexity and 
challenges of actually making the calculations. For example, if a 
pizzeria charges a five-dollar fee to deliver a pizza from its restaurant 
to a home three miles away, what is the net social benefit of that 
activity?262 A naïve answer might be that the flight generated five 
dollars in value, since that is what the pizza customer paid for it. 
However, the actual net benefit could be significantly greater or less 
than five dollars. Among other things, the use of a drone rather than 
an automobile to deliver the pizza would likely reduce the total 
carbon dioxide emissions or other harmful environmental impacts 
involved.263 Drone-assisted deliveries might also help reduce traffic 
congestion and pose comparatively fewer risks to pedestrians and on-
 
 261. For a more thorough examination of this concept, see supra Section IV.B. 
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Rebecca Borison, This Russian Pizzeria Will Deliver Your Pizza by Drone, BUS. INSIDER 
(June 23, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-pizzeria-delivers-pizza-
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perma.cc/MLF4-VW3E] (describing how, in India, Francesco’s Pizza reduced its pizza 
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road vehicles.264 On the other hand, the delivery drone’s buzz and 
presence overhead might disturb land use activities below or create 
additional safety or privacy risks. In practice, it would be impossible 
to accurately measure all such costs and benefits for every 
conceivable drone flight and fully account for them in a set of local 
drone restrictions. And even if that were possible, the calculation 
would still be incomplete; officials would need to factor all of the 
costs of creating, implementing, and enforcing drone use restrictions 
into the calculation as well. 
Fortunately, despite imperfect information and other limitations, 
a wide range of valuable land use regulatory activities still occur every 
day in municipalities throughout the country, and cost-benefit 
analysis is often implicit in those policy decisions.265 Local drone use 
regulations would be no different in that regard, and at least 
attempting to identify and consider costs and benefits is a vital 
exercise when forming local drone zoning policies. 
B. Incorporating the Dimension of Time 
One promising way to improve the precision and efficiency of 
local drone use regulation is to craft drone use rules that vary based 
on the time of day, the day of the week, the month, or the year. There 
seem to be greater possibilities for varying restrictions based on this 
“fourth dimension” of time in the context of drone law than there has 
ever been in the realm of land use regulation.266 Flying a drone is a far 
more temporary activity than most of the land development matters 
that municipalities restrict under ordinary zoning ordinances.267 
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95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016) 
188 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
Constructing a building on land involves a sizable financial 
investment, tends to occur infrequently on any given parcel, and often 
has decades-long impacts.268 In contrast, civilian drone flights and 
their effects on land uses tend to be short-lived and can recur multiple 
times in a day.269 
The specific timing and context of drone activity can also greatly 
impact the nature and extent of its impacts on nearby land uses.270 For 
example, in residential communities where preserving the privacy of 
backyard patios and swimming pools is paramount, drone flights on 
weekend afternoons during the summer months might be far more 
disruptive than identical flights over the same areas on weekday 
mornings during winter months.271 Accordingly, policymakers are 
already beginning to tailor drone restrictions to specify not only 
where citizens may operate drones, but also when they may operate 
them.272 
A simple graphical analysis comparable to the one Professor 
William Fischel has used in the air pollution context helps to illustrate 
the potential efficiency advantages of incorporating the dimension of 
time into drone use restrictions.273 Figure A below depicts the costs 
and benefits of drone activity in a hypothetical residential 
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 271. See id. (conceding that examples of drones peeping down onto private swimmers 
and sunbathers are concrete and relatable, implying a real and heightened privacy 
concern, but emphasizing that these are not the only privacy concerns related to drone 
use).  
 272. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., Cities Hosting the Papal Visit Are 
No Drone Zones (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm
?newsId=19474 [https://perma.cc/V3AT-7CW8] (demonstrating an example of a time-
based restriction and explaining that Washington, D.C.; New York, New York; and 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were FAA-designated no drone zones from September 22 to 
September 27, 2015). 
 273. See FISCHEL, supra note 191, at 82–93. 
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neighborhood.274 The curve labeled MC in Figure A represents the 
marginal cost to society from each additional hour per year of low-
altitude drone activity occurring in the area.275 Most of the costs 
reflected in this sort of curve are likely to relate to drones’ potential 
to interfere with residents’ safety, privacy, and quiet enjoyment of 
their land. The curve’s shape, initially sloping downward and then 
gradually sloping upward, is based on assumptions that the first few 
hours of permitted drone activity per year tend to be particularly 
disruptive of landowner privacy and that the severity of disruption 
beyond that initial quantity of flying varies depending on the time of 
day or year.276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 274. See, e.g., id. (using an analytical approach—which is analogous to that of this 
Section—to conduct a similar analysis for determining the optimal amount of permissible 
air pollution from a mill based on the benefits to the mill and costs to the community). 
 275. This analysis assumes that the social marginal cost of a drone flight includes all 
costs to the individual operating the drone (private marginal cost) and all costs to all 
others in society that are attributable to that drone flight. It makes similar assumptions 
regarding the social marginal benefits of drone flying. For a more detailed explanation of 
the concept of social marginal cost and how it differs from private marginal cost, see 
generally KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS	381–83 (1989). For 
simplicity, the analysis also holds all other variables constant, including the types of 
involved drones, the nature of their flight activity, and the population density and land 
uses below drone flights. 
 276. While such assumptions would not conform to reality in all locations, they are 
seemingly plausible as a hypothetical matter and are made to facilitate full illustration of 
this mode of analysis. 
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Figure A: Social Marginal Costs and Benefits of Drone Use in a 
Hypothetical Residential Neighborhood 
 
In contrast, the curve labeled MB in Figure A represents the 
hypothetical marginal benefits to society from each additional hour 
per year of drone flying in this hypothetical neighborhood. Such 
benefits might include the enjoyment that hobbyists and spectators 
derive from operating or watching small drones within the 
community. They might also include the time and resource savings 
achievable through drone-assisted delivery services, or the value of 
being able to capture drone-assisted aerial photos or video footage 
without the greater expense and safety risks associated with using 
manned aircraft. The benefits associated with countless other 
potential drone uses, ranging from agricultural applications277 to data 
gathering,278 would be encompassed in this curve as well. The curve’s 
slight downward slope reflects an assumption of diminishing marginal 
 
 277. See generally Todd J. Janzen & Thomas P. Redick, Drone Use in Agriculture at 
Home and Abroad—U.S. Law Still “Up in the Air”, 19 A.B.A AGRIC. MGMT. COMM. 
NEWSL., Sept. 2014, at 6, 6–7 (showing an introductory primer on the potential use of 
drone technologies in agriculture and some of the unresolved legal issues associated with 
drones). 
 278. See, e.g., Emma Marris, Fly, and Bring Me Data, NATURE, June 2013, at 156, 156–
58 (2013) (showing the potential applications of drone technologies by describing how 
drones are assisting with data gathering for scientific research). 
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returns from each additional hour of drone activity in the 
community.279 
The point labeled Q*, situated at the intersection of the MC and 
MB curves in Figure A, represents the optimal quantity of drone 
activity in this hypothetical neighborhood. The location of Q* near 
the middle of the graph’s x-axis suggests that drone activity in this 
hypothetical neighborhood would generate positive net social benefits 
much of the time. An optimal set of rules for this neighborhood 
would produce exactly Q* hours per year of drone use.280 
Unfortunately, much of today’s drone use regulation fails to 
consider the element of time and is thus highly prone to 
inefficiency.281 The shaded areas in Figure A illustrate the potential 
social welfare losses associated with these sorts of imprecise drone 
restrictions. The shaded triangular area to the left of Q* in Figure A 
represents the deadweight loss that would result under a law flatly 
prohibiting any and all drone activity in this hypothetical 
neighborhood.282 Such a restriction would create this deadweight loss 
because it would preclude Q* hours of cost-justified drone flying per 
year—drone activity that would have otherwise generated societal 
benefits in excess of its costs. Ordinances recently adopted in some 
cities that sweepingly prohibit all civilian drone activity within their 
boundaries generate these sorts of efficiency losses.283 
Conversely, the lighter shaded triangular area situated to the 
right of Q* represents the potential deadweight loss under an 
excessively permissive rule that allows drone activity within this 
hypothetical neighborhood all day every day. Such a rule would 
permit hours of drone activities in excess of Q*, which would impose 
costs on society that would outweigh the commensurate benefits. If 
the FAA granted broad drone use authorizations to companies such 
as Amazon and Alphabet under a “ceiling preemption” rule that 
 
 279. See, e.g., CASE & FAIR, supra note 275, at 140, 170–71 (describing diminishing 
marginal returns, diminishing marginal utility, and diminishing marginal productivity).  
 280. See id. at 196–97 (explaining the general principle that the optimal quantity of an 
activity is the quantity at which the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost). 
 281. See, e.g., FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §	333, 
126 Stat. 75, 75–76 (2012) (lacking temporal restrictions on drone regulations).  
 282. See, e.g., PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., MUN. CODE §	10-12 (2015), http://www.ci.paradise
-valley.az.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/101 [https://perma.cc/UD3X-7HV4] (demonstrating 
an example of a city that has adopted a flat prohibition of drone use in neighborhoods). 
 283. See id. 
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would preempt state and local restrictions, it would generate this 
troubling class of social welfare losses.284 
Temporal drone use restrictions have the potential to reduce the 
sorts of efficiency losses represented in the two shaded areas in Figure 
A. An ordinance allowing drone uses only on certain days of the 
week or times of day within a neighborhood could do far better than 
either a flat prohibition or a broad authorization of drone use at 
promoting a quantity of drone activity that approximates Q*. For 
instance, local officials might opt to allow drone activity within a 
neighborhood only on weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 
p.m. to 4:00 p.m., if it determined that drone flying during these 
limited hours seemed to generate the greatest net benefits based on 
officials’ estimates of the value of drone delivery services and other 
drone uses in the area, landowners’ privacy interests, and other 
relevant factors. As technology advances, municipalities might 
someday even be able to charge fees for drone uses that vary based 
on the drone’s location and the time of day. Some governments 
already use similar temporal fee systems to help regulate traffic on 
congested roadways.285 
C. Designating Drone Zones 
The greatest potential advantage of drone zoning ordinances 
over general drone regulations is the ability to tailor drone use rules 
to fit specific neighborhoods across a city. The graph in Figure A 
shows only the costs and benefits of drone activity associated with a 
single hypothetical neighborhood. Other neighborhoods within a city 
are likely to have quite different cost-benefit profiles. Drone zoning 
can help governments craft restrictions that account for such 
differences in the same way that land use zoning has served that 
function for nearly a century.286 The following extended hypothetical 
helps to demonstrate the potential usefulness of drone zoning and 
highlights some additional principles for designating drone zones. 
Suppose that, after receiving multiple citizen complaints about 
civilian drones flying within certain neighborhoods, officials in 
Hoverville, a second hypothetical city in the United States, began 
 
 284. See supra notes 119–27 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed 
description of “ceiling preemption” and its potential impacts). 
 285. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of 
Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 723–25 (2008) 
(describing temporal congestion pricing schemes applicable on certain roadways in New 
Jersey and elsewhere). 
 286. See supra Section III.C.3. 
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considering ordinances aimed at addressing the problem. Intrigued by 
the potential economic development opportunities available through 
drone technologies, officials did not want to impose a blanket 
moratorium or prohibition on drone use within the city. Therefore, 
they opted to instead treat civilian drone activity as something akin to 
a land use and tackle the issue through a drone zoning ordinance. 
 
Figure B: Portions of Hoverville’s Hypothetical Zoning Map 
 
Using the best information available to them, Hoverville city 
officials prepared the simple drone overlay zoning map shown in 
Figure B above. The map shows the new “drone zoning” designations 
the officials made for each area, labeled as D-1, D-2, and D-3. These 
new designations supplemented rather than displaced the residential, 
commercial, industrial, and other land use zoning designations on the 
city’s existing zoning map. 
1.  No Drone Zones 
Drone zoning ordinances could enable cities to severely restrict 
drone uses in neighborhoods that are poorly suited for widespread 
drone activity. Suppose, for example, that most of the drone-related 
complaints that prompted Hoverville city officials to craft the city’s 
drone ordinance involved certain residential areas near a public park 
and golf course on the western side of town. In these neighborhoods, 
which were filled with single-family homes and backyard swimming 
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pools, most residents opposed any flying of drones except in 
emergency situations. The overriding concern in these residential 
communities was the threat of drones interfering with privacy and 
tranquility. 
 
Figure C: Social Marginal Costs and Benefits of Drone Use in a 
Hypothetical “No Drone Zone” 
 
 
 
 
The graph in Figure C above employs the basic graphical 
approach and background assumptions used in Figure A to depict the 
hypothetical costs and benefits of drone flying in these types of 
privacy-sensitive neighborhoods. The optimal quantity of drone 
activity shown in this new graph—labeled Q1*—is significantly lower 
than the Q* equilibrium quantity shown in Figure A. Only drone 
activity up to a quantity of Q1* hours per year within these 
communities would generate social benefits sufficient to outweigh the 
accompanying social costs. 
Recognizing that only a negligible amount of drone activity in 
these sorts of neighborhoods was cost-justifiable, Hoverville’s city 
council opted to designate them as “D-1” or “no drone zones,” 
generally prohibiting drone activity.287 However, the city also knew 
that Q1* was greater than zero; therefore, officials recognized some 
 
 287. See PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., MUN. CODE §	10-12 (2015), http://www.ci.paradise-
valley.az.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/101 [https://perma.cc/UD3X-7HV4] (showing an 
example of a city that has already enacted an ordinance effectively designating its entire 
jurisdiction as a no drone zone). 
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narrow circumstances under which the benefits of drone flying in 
these areas exceeded the costs. For instance, residents might 
occasionally wish to capture drone-assisted aerial video footage of a 
backyard wedding on their land or to take aerial photos of a home 
they were listing for sale.288 To accommodate this narrow set of 
justifiable drone uses, the city could add provisions to its drone 
ordinance that would allow citizens to seek temporary use permits for 
drone activities at certain requested places and times within D-1 
zones.289 That permit process could require applicants to provide 
written notice to all landowners within a specified radius of the flight 
area, making neighbors aware of the proposed drone use and 
providing an opportunity for them to reasonably object. The 
ordinance provisions relating to these D-1 zones could likewise 
provide clear exceptions for occasional drone uses by law 
enforcement agencies and emergency responders under specified 
conditions. 
2.  Limited Drone Use Zones 
Of course, drone zoning can enable cities to establish and 
enforce less restrictive drone use rules in neighborhoods where drone 
activity is somewhat more cost-justifiable. For simplicity, this diverse 
set of neighborhoods better suited for somewhat less restrictive rules 
is collectively classified in this Article as “D-2” or “limited drone use” 
zones. The commercially zoned areas and the multi-family/mixed use 
neighborhood shown in Figure B are potentially good candidates for 
the D-2 drone zoning designation. The social costs and benefits of 
drone activity in these sorts of areas are generally comparable to 
those graphically depicted in Figure A above, which shows Q*—some 
moderate amount—as the optimal quantity of drone use.290 
There are countless reasons why this D-2 class of neighborhoods 
might benefit from a greater amount of drone activity than is 
permitted in D-1 zones. On the cost side of the equation, if fewer 
residents within an area have private backyards or swimming pools, 
drone flights there might pose a comparatively smaller threat to 
landowner privacy. On the benefits side, severe traffic congestion, a 
 
 288. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (referencing these types of drone 
uses, which landowners tend to demand only occasionally on any given parcel). 
 289. Temporary use permits are a common and often valuable tool for incorporating 
flexibility into land use and zoning policies. See David S. Silverman, The Temporary Use 
and Economic Development, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., July 2014, at 8, 8 (providing an 
informative discussion of temporary use permits). 
 290. See supra notes 273–80 and accompanying text. 
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dearth of nearby brick-and-mortar shopping, or parking limits that 
make shopping more difficult in an area might make drone-assisted 
delivery services comparatively more appealing. 
As stated above, neighborhoods in this middle ground may be 
best served through ordinances that only allow drone activities during 
certain specified hours and days.291 Ordinance provisions for these 
zones that limit drone use might also distinguish between commercial 
or recreational drone uses. For example, an ordinance might allow 
registered commercial drones to operate on weekdays during certain 
business hours, yet limit recreational drone activity to a narrower set 
of places and times. 
3.  Open Drone Zones 
Those areas of a city or county that are ideally suited for a high 
volume of drone activity may warrant an even less restrictive 
regulatory approach than is available under a drone zoning 
designation like D-2. The neighborhoods designated as “D-3,” or 
“open drone use” zone areas on the hypothetical map in Figure B, 
represent this third general category of zones. Many industrially 
zoned neighborhoods, which have few residents and instead house 
warehouses, factories, rail yards, and the like, might fit into this 
category. Even the downtown areas of some major cities may benefit 
from relatively relaxed drone restrictions. Such areas tend to be 
densely developed, with window-covered, high-rise buildings 
towering above both sides of the street. Since there are fewer 
backyards or outdoor living spaces in these areas, drone activity might 
pose less of a threat to landowner privacy than in single-family 
residential communities. And severe traffic congestion problems in 
some downtown cores could make drone delivery service there 
particularly valuable.292 
The hypothetical marginal costs and benefits associated with 
drone flying within these open drone use zoning areas are graphically 
depicted in Figure D below. As the location of the Q3* equilibrium 
point on the right side of the graph suggests, the social benefits of 
drone activity within these areas exceeds its potential social costs 
 
 291. See supra Section IV.B. 
 292. Many major downtown cores throughout the world are notorious for having 
severe congestion challenges. See, e.g., Josh Cohen, Dublin City Council Poised to Ban 
Cars in City Center, NEXT CITY (June 12, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/dublin-ban-
cars-city-center-city-council-vote [https://perma.cc/JX64-NYHG] (reporting that “congestion 
is a major problem in Dublin” and that congestion problems are “nearly standard in 
modern cities”). 
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most of the time. Accordingly, an optimal set of drone use rules in 
these sorts of zones would broadly sanction drone activity during 
daylight hours. 
 
Figure D: Social Marginal Costs and Benefits of Drone Use in a 
Hypothetical “Open Drone Zone” 
 
Even though drone use would be liberally allowed in D-3 zones, 
municipalities could still craft special provisions to restrict drone 
activity on specified occasions. For instance, the downtown cores of 
many major cities serve as the sites of outdoor festivals, parades, and 
marathons, and they often feature concert halls and open-air 
professional sports stadiums that regularly draw crowds. Drone 
activity might be especially hazardous to safety in downtown areas 
during these sorts of events. The steep upward slope of the marginal 
cost curve on the right side of the graph in Figure D reflects these 
heightened costs. Like traffic signs near elementary schools that 
require motorists to observe lower speed limits during school hours, 
rules that prohibit or severely limit drone activity during such major 
events could easily address these sorts of issues. 
A few government entities have already begun imposing special 
temporary drone restrictions during public events when they 
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anticipate temporary spikes in the social costs of drone use.293 For 
example, the Augusta-Richmond County Commission in Georgia 
adopted an ordinance prohibiting the use of drones within the county 
from April 2 to April 13, 2015—roughly the same time as the 
Professional Golfers Association’s prestigious Masters 
Tournament.294 Such approaches can help to preserve public safety 
and security during major events without precluding valuable drone 
activities during other periods. 
4.  The Sky Is the Limit 
The simple drone zoning concepts outlined in Part IV barely 
scratch the surface of what could eventually develop into a robust and 
sophisticated area of local government law. Countless other 
possibilities for drone zoning remain unexplored. Cities could 
someday engage in more detailed three-dimensional drone zoning—
zoning that delineates different sets of rules based on whether a drone 
is hovering 50, 150, or 300 feet above the ground. Cities could likewise 
vary drone speed limits by altitude and zone, provide for seasonal 
variations in drone restrictions across zones, create a far greater 
diversity of drone zones, and pursue limitless other strategies. 
In addition, rapidly developing geofence systems and related 
technologies could substantially reduce municipalities’ costs of 
establishing and enforcing the sorts of drone use restrictions 
described in this Article.295 Imagine a not-too-distant future day when 
cities that have enacted or amended drone zoning ordinances can 
simply submit GPS coordinates, time restrictions, and related 
information to a centralized geofence system database to create new 
geofences reflecting the city’s new ordinance provisions. The city 
would then make wireless updates to the software embedded in all 
drones registered to operate within the jurisdiction, ensuring that the 
 
 293. See, e.g., Susan McCord, Drone Ban in Effect April 2-13, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Mar. 
17, 2015), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2015-03-17/drone-ban-effect-april-2-
13# [https://perma.cc/AF63-RRHP] (demonstrating an example of a government entity 
imposing temporary drone restrictions during public events); Alex Miceli, Drones Banned 
Over Augusta During Masters, GOLFWEEK.COM (March 20, 2015), http://golfweek.com
/news/2015/mar/20/masters-2015-augusta-national-drones-banned/ [https://perma.cc/9EZM
-UGED] (noting that, “[w]ith the Masters being the biggest golf event on the calendar, the 
commission understandably wants to protect the event and the largess that it brings to the 
community each year”). 
 294. See Miceli, supra note 293. 
 295. For more details regarding geofence technologies, see supra notes 149–53 and 
accompanying text.  
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devices automatically recognize and obey the new ordinance rules.296 
As these sorts of technologies continue to mature and become even 
more cost-effective, they will only increase the appeal of local drone 
zoning ordinances and temporal drone restrictions. 
Unfortunately, the ultimate richness of drone policy depends 
heavily on the degree to which states and local governments are able 
to participate. Basic public choice theory principles suggest that 
powerful corporations with highly concentrated benefits at stake, such 
as Amazon and Alphabet, could well have the upper hand in battles 
over federal preemption of state and local drone laws.297 If these 
corporations succeed in persuading Congress and the FAA to largely 
block the development of state and municipal drone regulation, most 
of the policy innovations described in this Article will never come to 
fruition, and imprecise federal drone rules will occupy this regulatory 
space.298 There is a reason for optimism that a coordinated federal, 
state, and local drone regulatory structure could still ultimately 
emerge, however: the FAA’s new Small UAS Rule (Part 107), 
effective as of August 2016, did not provide for blanket preemption of 
state and local drone laws.299 Hopefully, federal policymakers will 
recognize what is at stake and embrace policies that promote the state 
and municipal involvement needed to facilitate a more efficient 
evolution of drone law. 
 
 296. Some drones are already capable of being updated to obey additional geofence 
restrictions. For example, DJI released a 2015 update downloadable by Phantom 2 drone 
owners that prevented those drones from entering airspace near the White House after a 
highly publicized drone incident above that property. See Nick Lavars, DJI Firmware 
Update Makes the White House a Drone No-Fly Zone, NEW ATLAS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://
newatlas.com/dji-firmware-drones-white-house/35890/ [https://perma.cc/UMP8-RN2Y]. 
 297. The notion that powerful stakeholders with highly concentrated benefits at stake 
tend to more easily secure desired policy outcomes than masses of individuals with highly 
diffused costs at stake is foundational in public choice theory. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, 
The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 195, 202 (1997) (noting that “[p]ublic choice theory suggests and observations 
confirm that political entrepreneurs	.	.	.	favor legislative programs with concentrated 
benefits and diffuse costs” (citation omitted)); Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of 
Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 90 (2009) (discussing the “public choice theory” that 
“[g]overnment institutions	.	.	.	are prone to capture by special interests that have an 
incentive to obtain concentrated benefits by imposing diffuse costs on the general public” 
(citation omitted)). 
 298. As of July 2016, a bill had cleared the United States Senate that, if enacted, would 
preempt most state and local drone regulation. See Federal Aviation Administration 
Reauthorization Act of 2016, S. 2658, 114th Cong. §	2142(a) (2016). For the author’s own 
description of the preemption provisions in the bill and their potential impacts, see Troy 
A. Rule, Take Cover Against This Drone Attack, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2016, at A13.  
 299. See supra notes 51, 97–98 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Drone technologies have the potential to enhance productivity 
and benefit lives in a diverse array of settings throughout the world. 
However, these benefits to society could also be unduly limited if 
outmoded or ill-suited regulatory structures get in their way. 
Engineers’ exceptional ingenuity and vision has driven rapid 
advancements in drone technologies in recent years. Now 
policymakers must exhibit an equal degree of inventiveness in their 
efforts to build regulatory systems capable of effectively governing 
these powerful devices. 
Although drones bear many similarities to the airplanes and 
manned helicopters that the FAA has long regulated, drones are also 
distinct in ways that necessitate a more coordinated federal, state, and 
local regulatory framework. Drone zoning ordinances could be an 
important local-level component of that framework, enabling 
municipalities to vary drone use restrictions based on the unique 
attributes of specific neighborhoods within their jurisdictions. As 
drone activity grows ever more common, such ordinances could 
become a vital means of supplying the flexibility and local 
participation needed to optimally balance drone use with landowner 
safety and privacy in communities across the globe. 
 
